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A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A
Critical Review of the Current Moon
Treaty and a Proposed Alternative
DAVID EVERETT MARKO*
INTRODUCTION
A few thousand miles beyond our little planet, there are
enough natural resources to "support a civilization many thou-
sand times larger than the Earth's population."' Who owns those
resources? Who has the right to use and appropriate them? Who
should? Today there is no widely accepted international law
governing the moon and other celestial bodies. In the next decade
the world faces the intricate task of successfully fashioning a
natural resources agreement for the moon and other mineral-
rich bodies that satisfies the concerns of all humanity.
This paper is designed to provide a framework for a work-
able space exploration policy that is committed to the equitable
distribution of natural resources2 between all states. Part one is
a review of the existing Moon Treaty and a demonstration of
its shortcomings in the regulation of celestial resource exploita-
tion. Part two is a draft proposal for an alternative Moon
Treaty, that avoids many of the shortcomings of the status quo.
I. REVIEW OF THE MOON TREATY
The Moon Treaty3 is one of five stars in the constellation of
space law. "The product of many labors,"' 4 the treaty is the
* J.D., 1991, Florida State University; LL.M. in International Law, 1992, Free
University of Brussels. The author is presently an associate with the law firm of Starkman
& Magolnick, P.A. in Miami, Florida. The author expresses his gratitude to Professors
Donna Christie (Florida State University) and Meri Sybesma-Knoll (Free University of
Brussels) for their guidance. The author also wishes to thank Mr. Eduardo Bruz for his
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have been.
I NAT'L COMM'N ON SPACE, PIoIrEERIaN = SPACE FRONMR 3 (1986).
2 The discussion of natural resources is limited to the development and exploita-
tion of "hard" mineral resources. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
I Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
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culmination of nine years of exhausting debate and compromise.
To understand the substance of the treaty, a brief discussion of
international law and space law is necessary.' The next section
is designed to provide that basic understanding, followed by a
critical examination of the Moon Treaty.
A. Background
1. Custom and Treaty Law
International law has two origins: custom and treaty.6 Cus-
tomary law is based on general principles that are observed.
These principles are considered binding by civilized nations. It
results from the general and consistent practice of states to act
out of a sense of legal obligation. 7 The "practice of states" is
governmental conduct made official by statements at interna-
tional conferences or in diplomatic exchanges, formal instruc-
tions to diplomatic agents, governmental decisions on matters
of international concern (judicial, executive, or legislative), other
similar acts, or inaction.' Along with the conduct element, states
must possess opinio juris sive necessitatis-a conviction that the
rule is obligatory. Opinio juris may be inferred from a state's
general and consistent following of the rule over a long period
of time. It does not have to be universally accepted within the
international community. However, there cannot be a significant
amount of opposition. Further, it generally must be accepted by
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess.,
Agenda Items 48, 49, at 1, U.N. Doe. A/Res/34/68 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434-
41 (1970) [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
4 Carl Q. Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
14 INT'L LAW. 429 (1981).
' See generally GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROR-
LEMS Op LAW AND POLICY 25 (1989).
1 There are several other sources of international law. However, they all fall into
either the custom genre or the treaty genre. One source that should be noted in particular
is the general principle of "equity." This is based upon what is fair and just. RESTATE-
MET (THIRD) OF nTH FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 102(2) cmt. m
(1987) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See also infra text accompanying notes 175-203. Other
sources identified are general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judicial
decisions and the teachings of qualified authorities. I.C.I. Stat. art. 38(l).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 102(2).
Id. at cmt. b.
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the world's great powers, as well as by smaller states that are
directly affected by the particular custom.9
Treaties are the second source of international law. 10 Treaties
are the memorialization of agreements made between states.
Treaties exist to eliminate ambiguities, minimize confusion, and
to clarify the future obligations of parties." Prior to the initial
resolutions and treaties adopted by the United Nations, space
existed in a pristine state. However, it is reasonable to expect
that, as space access and use become more widespread, custom-
ary law will evolve.'
2
The two key problems with treaty law are enforcement and
interpretation. Nations that violate treaty law are subject to
penalties that are only enforceable by nations which are willing
to take action. The potential "penalties" include condemnation,
trade restrictions, international isolation, and war. 3 If few nations
are willing or capable of abiding by a treaty, then it is not worth
the paper it is written on.' 4 The second problem with treaty law
is precise interpretation. The guidelines are the same as for
contracts, statutes, and other legal documents: interpreters look
to the language, the intent of the parties, and general rules of
construction. '5 However, ambiguities in international law still
9 Id. at cmt. c.
10 REYNoLDs & MERGES, supra note 5, at 25.
1Id. at 26-27. However, treaties are not always successful in achieving their
purposes. Any nation will violate a treaty when it is in their interest to do so. See W.
Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of
International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984).
12 The majority of legal scholars are of the opinion that some notions of interna-
tional law are vague statements of ideals (i.e., reflections of political aspiration and
moral commitment), not substantive law. However, those vague terms and phrases may
ultimately ripen into rules of conduct through the evolution of political realities. See
Scott Ervin, Note, Law in a Vacuum: The Common Heritage Doctrine in Outer Space
Law, 7 B.C. INT'L & Coms. L. REv. 403, 424-25 (1984).
13 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 27.
"4 It should be recognized, however, that if most nations are willing to voluntarily
abide by the treaty, it is worth infinitely more than the paper it is written on.
o1 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 27. Other factors in interpreting treaty
ambiguities were identified in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
ARTICLE 31 General rule of interpretation
I. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in the context and
in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
1992-93]
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occur; interpretation problems are heightened by the use of
different languages in the negotiation and creation of treaties.
16
2. Property Rights in Space
International law controls the system of resource distribution
by establishing rules which nations must follow in order to assert
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as
an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-
tation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which estab-
lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it established that the
parties so intended.
ARTICLE 32 Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, in-
cluding the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion, in order to confirm the resulting from the application of article
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
ARTICLE 33 Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more
languages
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, text
is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the
parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which
the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the
treaty so provides or the treaties so agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in
each authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph
I, when a comparison of the authentic text discloses a difference of
meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the
meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and
purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31-33, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, S I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1990).
11 A classic example is the use of "province of all mankind" in Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty. See Multilateral Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410. The word "province" means substan-
tially different things in English, French, Spanish, and Russian; all of which are "offi-
cial" languages in the treaty. See B. Malorsky, A Few Reflections on the Meaning and
the Interpretation of "Province of All Mankind" and "Common Heritage of Mankind"
Notions, PROC. OF THE 29TH COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF OUrE SPACE 58, 59-60 (1987).
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legitimate property claims. Sovereignty is at the heart of property
rights.' 7 The structuring of celestial property rights begins with
an evaluation of space in its pristine state.' The sovereign, if
anyone, determines the type of political and economic structures
to be established.
There are three prevailing approaches to determining sover-
eignty over celestial natural resources: res nullius, res communis,
and "freedom of outer space." Res nullius is the philosophy
that views outer space as "unclaimed territory." According to
this theory, space belongs to no one and may be appropriated
to the exclusion of others.19 The res nullius approach is one of
domination via occupation. It is within this framework that the
developing nations" see inequities. 2' As is evidenced by the cur-
rent distribution of the earth's resources, a nation may exercise
sovereignty over resources to the exclusion of other nations, thus
preempting all others' demands for access to that same prop-
erty.Y Res nullius is the view currently held by developed coun-
tries and the major corporations that seek to exploit the moon
and other celestial resources for their own profit.
A second approach to resource distribution is res communis.
This approach is advocated by the developing countries. 23 It is
an approach of open or common access to resources. It is
generally believed that the method of managing this type of
property is to have a common ownership scheme or an inter-
national regime.2 The alternative would be to have a method of
" See LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIOriAL LAW: A TREATISE 543-46 (8th ed. 1955).
" Fred Kosmo, Note, Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory Scheme that
Promotes Commercial Ventures and international Responsibility, 61 So. CAL. L. REV.
1055, 1073 (1988).
'1 John Van Dyke & Christopher Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the
High Seas": Which Governs the Seabed? 19 SAN DImno L. REv. 493, 514-19 (1982).
Developing nations are the group of approximately 120 countries, primarily
located in the southern hemispheric continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
These countries are also known as the "third world," "fourth world," "the south,"
and "lesser developed countries," "underdeveloped countries," and "non-aligned coun-
tries." See Alan Friedman & Cynthia A. Williams, The Group of 77 at the United
Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIGO L. REV. 555 (1979).
21 Richard B. Bilder, International Law and Natural Resource Policies, 26 NAT.
RESOUaCES J. 451, 466-67 (1980).
Stephen P. Mau, Equity, the Third World and the Moon Treaty, 8 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 221, 232 (1984).
" Kosmo, supra note 18, at 1074.
"IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLEs oF PuaLc INTERNATIoNAL LAW 178 (4th ed. 1990).
1992-931
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resource management. 2 Res communis generally applies to re-
sources that are available in such abundance or are so remote
that there are no conflicts among current or potential users, like
the resources in the seabed or outer space.6
The third view, which is generally held by the developed
countries, especially the United States, is grounded in the "free-
dom of the high seas" philosophy.2 7 In the context of celestial
resource issues, this philosophy could be viewed as the "freedom
of outer space." 2s According to this doctrine, "no state may
claim or acquire exclusive sovereign rights to an area of pristine
space.' '29 However, absent some agreement to the contrary, par-
ties may use or exploit space resources, as long as there is
reasonable regard for the rights and activities of others.30
3. History of Space Law
The launch of Sputnik by the former Soviet Union awakened
the world to the imminent legal implications of space activities.3'
The debate on this issue resulted in the creation of the United
Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) in 1958.32 COPUOS, which became a permanent
body of the United Nations in 1959,13 has had several successes
in the creation of international space law. The first major success
was the unanimous approval of the Declaration of Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
2 Bin Cheng, The Legal Regime of Air Space and Outer Space: The Boundary
Problem Functionalism versus Spatialism: The Major Premises, 5 ANNAiS OF Am &
SPACE L. 323, 335-38 (1980).
m Mau, supra note 22, at 232.
See generally HuGo GRoTTus, DE JuRE PRAEDAE (1609). For a review of the
American version of this theory, see Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 19, at 501-14;
Kosmo, supra note 18, at 1074.
n Kosmo, supra note 18, at 1074.
N Id.
" Id.
" Eilene Galloway, The Definition of Space Law, PRoc. OF THE 32NTD COLLOQUrum
ON THE LAW oF OurER SPACE 331, 331 (1989).
32 See generally Philip C. Jessup & Howard J. Taubenfeld, The United Nations
Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 53 Am. J. OF INT'L LAW 877
(1959) (explaining the history and formation of COPUOS).
11 On December 11, 1959 a draft resolution was submitted to the United Nations,
calling for the establishment of a standing committee. On December 12, 1959, the
General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution. See G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); see also Ervin, supra note 12 at 403.
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of Outer Space, 34 which ultimately resulted in the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty.35 The bases of the treaty are the notions that all
states shall have equal rights of exploration and use of outer
space,36 that activities in outer space are to be conducted in the
interest and for the benefit of all humankind, 37 and that outer
space is not subject to the sovereignty of any nation.38
The Outer Space Treaty was an important step in interna-
tional relations because it rejected res nullius with regard to the
exploration of celestial bodies.3 9 The treaty embraced the notion
that outer space is the "province of all mankind and should be
developed for its benefit. "40 The treaty is also important because
it was the first attempt to fill the legal vacuum in space; rules
were created where none previously existed. The Outer Space
Treaty became a framework for building cooperation and peace
in future space relations41 through the adoption of three guiding
principles: (1) international law, and specifically, the United
Nations Charter should apply to outer space activities; (2) outer
space should be free for exploration and use by all states; and
(3) outer space should not be subject to national appropriation
or claims of sovereignty. 42
The next treaty governing space exploration activities was
the "Astronaut Rescue Agreement." ' 43 This treaty imposed ob-
G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1962).
The Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
16 Id. at art. I.
37 Id.
11 Id. at art. II. See Leslie I. Tennen, Outer Space: A Preserve for All Human
Kind, 2 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. & Bus. 145, 149 (1979).
"1 Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of Regime to Govern
Resource Exploitation in Outer Space, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, 732 (1986).
40 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. I. The preamble to the 1958 space
resolution first suggested that the heavens should exist for the "benefit" of all mankind.
G.A. Res. 1348, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 18 at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
4 Ervin, supra note 12, at 409. President Lyndon Johnson once noted:
The Future leaves no option. Responsible men must push forward in the
exploration of outer space, near and far. Their voyages must be made in
peace for purposes of peace on earth. This Treaty is'a step - a first, but
a long step - toward assuring the peace essential for the longer journey.
I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 150 (1967).
Grier C. Raclin, International Cooperation in Commercial Activities in Outer
Space: Is it Necessary, Desirable, or Feasible?, PRoc. OF THE 30t COLLOQUrUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 234, 235 n.9 (1988).
3 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 (entered
into force with respect to the United States Dec. 3, 1968).
1992-93]
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ligations upon states to render all due aid and assistance to
distressed astronauts" and to return space objects which come
into their possession to the state that launched them. 45 The
purpose of the treaty was to further the cooperative nature of
international ventures in outer space by obligating all party
states. 6
The third treaty adopted as a result of the efforts of COP-
UOS was the "Liability Convention. '47 The Liability Conven-
tion imposes strict liability "upon launching states [or their
agents] for damage caused by spacecraft to aircraft in flight, or
on the surface of the earth." 48 Liability for damage caused to
another spacecraft is also provided and is predicated upon fault.49
Excluding the Moon Treaty, the most recently adopted space
treaty is the Convention Governing the Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (the "Registration Convention").
5
The Registration Convention requires launching states to main-
tain a registry of objects launched into the earth's orbit or
beyond and to supply that list to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations along with information regarding the object's
flight trajectories, orbital parameters, and intended purpose."
B. The Moon Treaty
The negotiations that resulted in the Moon Treaty occurred
between 1970 and 1979. The Legal Subcommittee held nine
sessions to discuss the differing points of view on the treaty. On
December 5, 1979, the United Nations General Assembly ap-
proved the Agreement5 2 Governing the Activities of States on
Id. at art. 2.
I d. at art. 5.3.
' Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 733.
, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Sept. 1, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 (entered into force with respect to the United States on
Oct. 9, 1973).
" Id. at art. II.
41 Id. at art Ill. See Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39 at 734 (regarding
damages, liability is apportioned on the basis of fault, with the launching state being
held liable only if injury is caused by its fault).
" Convention Governing the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, (entered into force with respect to the United States Sept
15, 1976) [hereinafter Registration Convention].
Id. at arts. II, IV.
Whether entitled "agreement" or "treaty," the Moon Treaty and all of these
space documents are treaties. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 898. (International
[VOL. 8:293
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the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies53 and requested the Sec-
retary-General to open the treaty for signature and ratification
at the earliest time 4 It was opened for signatures on December
19, 1979. 5 The treaty entered into force on July 11, 1984 upon
the signature of Austria, the fifth country to ratify the treaty .
6
To date, only seven countries have signed the treaty: Australia,
Austria, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines and
Uruguay.57
1. History of the Moon Treaty 8
In 1970, Argentina's representative to COPUOS, Professor
A.A. Cocca, submitted a "Draft Agreement on the Principles
Governing Activities in the Use of the Natural Resources of the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies." 5 9 Positing that "the use of
the Moon's natural resources had already begun"' 0 and that
there was a legal vacuum governing celestial resources, 6 Cocca
offered a five-article proposal to protect the interests of all state
compacts which take the form of written contracts are sometimes termed not only
agreements or treaties, but acts, conventions, declarations, protocols and the like. But
there is no essential difference between them, and their binding force upon the contract-
ing parties is the same, whatever their name may be.)
" Moon Treaty, supra note 3.
'4 STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
96th CONG., 2d Sass., REPORT AND STAFF MATERAI ON AGREEMENT GovERNING THE
AcTivrrrEs OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 1 (Comm. Print 1980)
(analyzing the report of Eilene Galloway) [hereinafter Committee Print].
" Nicolas Mateesco Matte, The Common Heritage of Mankind and Outer Space:
Toward a New International Order for Survival, 12 ANNALS OF AnR & SPACE L. 313,
319 (1987).
'4 Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 735.
17 Australia Acceeds to U.N. Moon Treaty, XrHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERV.,
AUG. 7, 1986, ITEM No. 0807120 available in LEXIS; Matte, supra note 55, at 319.
For a comprehensive review of space law leasing to the final draft of the Moon
Treaty, see Christol, supra note 4, at 448-83.
" U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 and Corr. 1 (1970), reprinted in Report of the
Legal Subcommittee on the Work of the Eleventh Session (10 Apr.- 5 May 1972); U.N.
Doc. A/AC/105/196 (1977), Annex I, at 6-7; Aldo Armando Cocca, Common Heritage
of Mankind: A Basic Principle of the International Legal System, PROC. OF THE 31ST
CoLLoQurum ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 89, 91 (1989).
w0 This is reference to the Apollo missions and certain Soviet lunar missions, where
samples were extracted from the soil for scientific purposes. Committee Print, supra
note 54, at 413.
61 This is reference to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which did not include specific
regulations of the moon and other celestial bodies. See Ervin, supra note 12, at 404.
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parties.62 The first article of the draft declared that "the natural
resources of the moon and other celestial bodies shall be the
common heritage of mankind.
'63
No action was taken at that timeA4 In May 1971, however,
then Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko, requested that
the General Assembly consider the "Preparation of an Interna-
tional Treaty Concerning the Moon." 65
That request was promptly followed by a Soviet proposalA66
The Soviet version was narrow when compared to the Argenti-
nean proposal: 67 the Soviets excluded any mention of common
62 The key provisions of the Argentinean proposal were:
Article 1. The natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies
shall be the common heritage of all mankind ...
Article 4. The benefits obtained from the use of the natural resources of
the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be made available to all peoples
without discrimination of any kind . . .
Article 5. In distributing such benefits, account shall be taken of the need
to promote the attainment of higher standards of living and conditions of
economic and social progress and development, pursuant to article 55a of
the Charter of the United Nations ("higher standards of living, full em-
ployment, and conditions of economic and social progress and develop-
ment"), in fight of the interests and requirement of the developing countries
and the rights of those undertaking these activities.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 and Corr. 1 (1970), reprinted in Report of the Legal
Subcommittee on the Work of the Eleventh Session (10 Apr.- 5 May 1972); U.N. Doc.
A/AC/105/196 (1977), Annex 1, at 6-7 [hereinafter Argentina Draft].
S3Id. at art. I.
" However, the United Nations was engaged in a related discussion on a deep
seabed treaty, involving many of the same concepts (like the common heritage of
mankind) proposed by Argentina in their lunar treaty proposals. Committee Print, supra
note 54, at 7-8. Those sea treaty discussions ultimately resulted in a seabed agreement.
See infra text accompanying notes 155-75.
" U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8391, (1971), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 839
(1971) (Letter and Annex of Treaty Concerning the Moon).
16 The following are several of the most important aspects of the Soviet lunar
treaty proposal of 1971:
Article 11 (1) The Moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively for
peaceful purposes.
Article 1II (1) State Parties shall strive to co-operate in matters relating to
activities on the Moon. Such co-operation may be on either on a multilat-
eral or a bilateral basis. (2) Each State Party shall engage in exploration
and use of the Moon with due regard to the interests of present and future
generations and with respect for rights of other States Parties as specified
in this treaty.
Article V (1) States Parties may pursue their activities in the exploration
and use of the Moon anywhere on the surface of the Moon, in its subsoil
or in circumlunar space.
U.N. Doc. A/C.I/L.568 (1971).
0 Mau, supra note 22, at 238.
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ownership or "common heritage" in their proposal and instead
proposed that "space be an international area for common
use.' ' The General Assembly responded to the Soviet proposal
by requesting that COPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee draft
a treaty concerning resource exploitation.69
The United States also had its say. In preparation for the
legal subcommittee sessions in 1972, the United States engaged
in an extensive revision of the Soviet Proposal.7 0 In opposition
to the Soviet draft which applied only to the moon, the United
States proposed that the treaty also ifclude "other celestial
bodies," a concept already embodied in the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty. 7' Originally, the United States, along with several third
world nations,7 2 supported the common heritage concept."v How-
Emilio Jacksetic, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Soviet Views, 28 Am. U.L.
REv. 483, 505 (1978) (quoting Dekanov, Some Questions of Juridical Nature of Areas
Withdrawn from State Sovereignty, 1973 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 214, 215 (1975)).
G.A. Res. 2779, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 29, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1972).
Committee Print, supra note 54, at 13.
I d.
The prevailing view among the third world countries was full embracing of the
"common heritage" concept. Committee Print, supra note 54, at 15. As is discussed
later, it is within this framework that the developing countries see solutions to the
problems of inequality. See Bilder, supra note 21.
The working paper proposed by Egypt and India best illustrates this notion:
(i) The Moon [and other celestial bodies] and their natural resources shall
be the common heritage of all mankind.
(ii) The exploration and use of the Moon [and other celestial bodies] and
their natural resources shall be carried out in the interest of mankind as a
whole and the benefits arising therefrom shall be made available to all
peoples without discrimination of any kind.
(iii) In the distribution of such benefits account shall be taken of the need
to promote the attainment of higher standards of living and conditions of
economic and social progress and development, pursuant to Article 55(a)
of the Charter of the United Nations in the interests and requirements of
the developing countries.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex I, at 24 (1977).
1, Nancy L. Griffin, Comment, Americans and the Moon Treaty, 46 J. Ant L. &
Com. 729, 731 (1981). United States support for the "common heritage" concept is best
illustrated by Herbert Reis, then the U.S. Representative to the Legal Subcommittee to
COPUOS:
On the broadest level of generality, it seems right to state that such
resources are part of 'the common heritage of all mankind'. This would
parallel the policy proposed by President Nixon two years ago this month
that all nations should regard the resources of the seabed ... as the
common heritage of mankind.
Statement by U.S. Representative Herbert Reis on the Work of the 1972 Session, United
Nations Outer Space Legal Subcommittee. U.S. Mission, Geneva, Switzerland 6 (May
3, 1972) (quoted in Committee Print, supra note 54, at 14).
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ever, as will be discussed in depth later in this paper, United
States' support eroded.1 4 Nevertheless, in 1972, consistent with
prevailing public opinion among United Nations delegates, the
United States introduced an article embracing the common her-
itage of mankind." Another United States proposal required
that parties to the moon agreement must carry out their activities
"consistent with international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations and other treaties in force." 76 On the issue of
the kind of information, if any, that should be disclosed prior
to a mission to the moon, the United States proposed that the
United Nations Secretary-General and certain parties in the sci-
entific community should be briefed on scientific and logistical
facts, as well as told about the purpose and results of the
mission.
77
In May 1972, after considerable debate, 78 consensus was
reached by COPUOS on twenty-one articles.7 9 By 1973, a draft
74 See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
7" The following is a text of U.S. Working Paper No. 12, Rev. 1, introduced on
Apr. 17, 1972 proposing an Article VIII on natural resources:
1. The natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be
the common heritage of all mankind.
2. States Parties may use appropriate quantities of the resources of the
Moon and other celestial bodies in carrying out scientific investigations in
furtherance of the provisions of this Treaty, whether supporting scientific
on the Moon or other celestial bodies or by removing such resources to
the Earth for analysis or analyzing them in space or on the Moon or other
celestial bodies.
3. The States Parties to this Treaty, bearing in mind the need for economic
advancement and for the encouragement of investment and efficient de-
velopment if utilization of the resources of the Moon and other celestial
bodies becomes a reality, recognize the importance of concluding agree-
ments in this area. To this end, the Depository Governments shall promptly
convene a meeting of all States parties, with a view to negotiating arrange-
ments for the international sharing of the benefits of such utilization when
one third of the States parties inform the Depository Governments that
they consider that practical utilization of the resources of the Moon or
other celestial bodies is likely to begin within two years following or has
already begun.
U.N. A/AC.105/C.2 (XI), 14 Apr. 1972. Also in A/AC.105/196, 11 Apr. 1977, Annex
1, at 23-24 (1977).
76 Committee Print, supra note 54, at 13. The 1977 report of the Legal Subcom-
mittee prepared copies of all working papers presented from 1972-1977. U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/196, Annex I, at 1-62 (1977).
" Other facts to be disclosed were intended location, orbital parameters, duration




version of the Moon Treaty was ready. 0 The treaty went through
several revisions,' and negotiations lasted nine years (1970-1979).12
The most critical compromises were reached on the "common
heritage" provision and in the establishment of an "international
regime" to govern the exploitation of celestial resources. Both
compromises are best illustrated through India's March 27, 1973
amendment to Article X of the draft treaty:
1. The moon and other celestial bodies, their subsoil as well
as their resources, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. States Parties undertake to establish an international re-
gime for the orderly and safe development and rational man-
agement of the resources of the moon and other celestial
resources and their subsoil, and for expanding opportunities
in the use thereof, and to insure the equitable sharing by all
states in the benefits derived therefrom, taking into particular
consideration the interests and needs of the developing coun-
tries.
3. Exploitation of the resources of the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies and their subsoil shall not be done except in
accordance with the international regime to be established. For
this purpose, the depository Governments shall convene a con-
ference of all States Parties at the request of one third .... 13
Though this amendment was popular with third world nations,
it was unacceptable to the United States and the Soviet Union.
4
The United States objected to a possible moratorium from Ar-
ticle X proscriptions limiting authorization for the removal of
natural resources to projects involving "scientific investigation."
Instead, the United States insisted on language indicating that a
moratorium against assertion of mineral rights would not apply
to mined resources obtained before the regime, or "subject to
the rules of the regime.
' '8 5
Mau, supra note 22, at 238. The treaty is too exhaustive to list in a footnote.
For a copy, see Legal Subcommittee Report A/AC.105/101 (1972).
1' Throughout the negotiation working papers were proposed by many nations:
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Iran,
Italy, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sweden, the United States,
the Soviet. union, Great Britain, and Venezuela. Committee Print, supra note 55, at 26-
27.
82 Mau, supra note 22, at 238.
" U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, at 11-12 (1977).
', Committee Print, supra note 55, at 27.
" Mau, supra note 22, at 238. The amendment substituted the term "in place" so
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The Soviet Union, until July 1979, opposed the "common
heritage" language. A March 1973 Soviet working paper ad-
dressed the issue:
One of the issues that still remains unresolved in the consid-
eration of the draft treaty relating to the moon is the use of
the concept of the "common heritage of all mankind ......
According to the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space, celestial bodies
are the province of all mankind. They are available for undi-
vided and common use of all States on earth, but are not
jointly owned by them. This is the essential feature of inter-
national law." 6
Eventually, the Soviets did accept the "common heritage"
concept. However, Soviet support was predicated on the require-
ment that the concept extend no further than the lunar agreement
and its eventual regime.8 7 Compromise succeeded. On December
5, 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, as a
resolution, the "Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies"-the Moon Treaty. 88
2. Description of the Moon Treaty
The Moon Treaty is a twenty-one article document which
applies to the moon and other celestial bodies in this solar
system, excluding the earth.8 9 Several key provisions of the treaty
should be examined. The Moon Treaty proclaims that "the
moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind." '9 Any exploration or exploitation of the moon is to
be carried on for the benefit of all parties to the treaty, without
regard to their level of development. 9' The treaty further pro-
claims that the moon is not subject to national appropriation as
that the same section of article X states that "Neither the surface nor the subsurface,
nor any part thereof or natural resources in place shall become the property of any
State..." Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the Work of its Eleventh Session Apr.
10 - May 5. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/l15 (1972).
" U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/II5, Annex I, at 24-25 (1973).
" U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203, at 2, 9-18 (1979).
" Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. GAOR (Agenda
Items 48 & 49) 1, U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979).
" Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art 1(1). For simplicity reasons, the term "moon"
will be used to describe any celestial body covered by the treaty.
Id. at art. XI(l).
Id. at art. IV(l).
[roL. 8:293
MOON TREATY
a result of any claims of sovereignty. 92 The purpose of these
proclamations is to insure that the resources of the moon never
become the property of any country or people. 93
The treaty also establishes that an international regime to
govern the exploitation of the moon and its resources is to be
created when such projects are technologically feasible." The
agreement provides that a conference is to be declared ten years
after it has come into force" or after it has been in force for at
least five years and one-third of the members to the agreement
call for a meeting." The treaty does not indicate that the meeting
necessarily must create a regime. More likely, the first few
meetings called will discuss the need for a regime at that time
and the type of regime it will be. The goals of the international
regime will include the development and rational management
of the moon's resources.97 The primary focus of the regime will
be the "equitable sharing" in the benefits derived from those
resources by all states. 98 The treaty fails to define "equitable. "99
However, the agreement does insist that, in setting up the regime,
the interests of the developing countries and the efforts of those
states that have contributed to the exploration of the moon are
to be given special consideration.' °0
The treaty also states that the moon is to be used exclusively
for peaceful purposes. 10' This prohibition includes a ban on
military bases, weapons tests, nuclear weapons, and the threat
of force. 102 However, military personnel are allowed as long as
they are engaged in scientific work or any other peaceful pur-
pose. 103
The Moon Treaty further states that lunar exploration is to
occur in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the
91 Id. at art. XI(2).
91 Id. at art. XI(3).
", Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. XI(5).
", The Moon Treaty came into force 11 July 1984. Raclin, From Ice to Ether,
supra note 39, 735.
Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. XVIII.
Id. at art. XI(7).
"Id.
Stephen A. Spitz, Note, Recent Developments: Space Law, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J.
579, 580 (1980).
"I Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. XI(7).
,0, Id. at art. IIl(l).
Im Id. at art. IIl (2), (3), (4).
103 Id. at art. 111(4).
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entire system of international law.""4 As such, nations are to be
guided by "principles of cooperation and mutual assistance"
and are to strive for the widest possible international coopera-
tion.' ° Examples of this cooperation are the sharing of scientific
samples and exchanges of personnel on lunar missions,"'" the
right to visit others' lunar installations, °7 prompt disclosure of
mission logistics and mission data to the Secretary-General, and
disclosure of the results of each mission, especially results con-
cerning natural resources or phenomena that might endanger
human life.1 0a Though cooperation and good-will are required in
the exploitation of outer space, the treaty does allow states to
retain control over their lunar missions. All states are free to
conduct scientific investigations, including space vehicle use, per-
sonnel and equipment placement and movement, and lunar space
stations. 0 9 This includes the right to own the equipment and
facilities placed on the moon, as well as to collect and keep
scientific samples."10
One final aspect of the treaty is the requirement that disputes
be settled in a peaceful manner."' A state that believes that
another party is violating the agreement may request consulta-
tions with that party. Any other party to the treaty may join
the consultation, and all shall try to achieve a mutually accept-
able resolution to the controversy. If these negotiations fail, the
disputing parties may attempt any appropriate method of peace -
ful resolution. The Secretary-General may be consulted in the
event that no resolution can be reached." 2 The treaty does not
provide for mandatory jurisdiction before an adjudicatory body
nor any other compulsory process in the event that negotiations
fail." 3
3. Controversial Aspects of the Moon Treaty-Concerns of
Developed Countries
Notwithstanding passage by the General Assembly and strong
arguments made by the proponents of ratification, the Moon
'o Id. at art. II.
105 Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art.IV(2).
Id. at art. VI(2), (3).
Id. at art. XV(1).
Id. at arts. XI(6), V(3).
Id. at arts. VIII(2), IX(I).
"' Moon Treaty, supra note 3. at arts. XII(1), VI(2).
Id. at art. XV.
,,2 Id. at art. XV(2).
113 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
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Treaty has been met with tremendous international resistance to
ratification by the governments of the potential parties to the
treaty. As indicated above, only seven countries have ratified
the Moon Treaty as law. 14 Included in the group of countries
that have refused to ratify the Moon Treaty are the United
States, the former Soviet Union (which still maintains a Com-
monwealth of Independent States space program), the European
Community Nations," 5 and dozens of developing countries.
Moreover, none of these countries have taken any steps to seek
the adoption of an acceptable alternative." 6 As long as these
developed countries do not embrace a moon agreement that
offers some protection for the third world, I17 there is little hope
for an equitable arrangement.
Several controversial clauses in the treaty have been the
reason for the "log jam." By analyzing the controversial aspects
of the treaty it is possible to learn from the mistakes of the
previous lunar agreement and propose a successful alternative." 8
a. The Common Heritage of Mankind
The concept that certain property could be commonly owned
by the international community dates back to 1910, when T.W.
Balch suggested that "Antarctica 'should become the common
possession of all members of the family of nations."' 9 It was
114 See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
"I The European Community, also known as the European Economic Community,
is made up of twelve nations: Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. THE EcONOMIST
(U.K.) July 7, 1990, at 12. It is the product of the Treaty of Rome, the goal of which
is the creation of a union of people "for a closer alliance to end all war." Jacques
Delors, Europe on the Way to 1992, INT'L AFF. (Moscow) Nov. 1989, at 1, 14. The
basic function of the community is the maintenance of a common customs union,
ensuring the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital among the member
states. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community. However, there has
also been movement toward union in other areas: monetary, environmental, social, and
military to name a few. See Single European Act; Maastrict Treaty.
116 Raclin, International Cooperation in Commercial Space Activities in Outer Space,
supra note 42, at 236.
'17 See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
1 George Santayana once said "those who cannot remember the past are con-
demned to repeat them." BART1Er's FAMIL4,R QUOTATIONS 867 (14th ed. 1968).
"' Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 737. On May 2, 1958, the United
States invited 12 states to a conference which would result in the Antarctica Treaty. See
Antarctica Treaty, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 opened for signature 1 December 1959 (entered into
force 23 June 1961); Matte, supra note 55, at 317 (The treaty provides that Antarctica
is to be used for "peaceful purposes only").
1992-93]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L.
not until 1952 that the concept was applied to outer space. Five
years before Sputnik, Oscar Schachner, then Assistant Director
of the United Nations Legal Department, submitted that space
and its celestial bodies should be considered "the common prop-
erty of all mankind over which no nation would be permitted
to exercise its domination." 120 The notion of protecting human-
kind's interests in space found its way into many space resolu-
tions121 Ultimately, the concept gained entry into the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty' 22 and finally into the Moon Treaty as the "com-
mon heritage of mankind" clause.
The conflict over the common heritage concept comes down
to one question: what theory of property does the common
heritage of mankind evoke, res communis, res nullius, or free-
dom of the seas? The developing countries see the common
heritage concept as focusing on their unjustifiable state of ine-
quality. Accordingly, they hold the notion that the Moon is
common property, res communis,23 and that taking property
declared to be the common heritage of mankind is stealing.11
121 Matte, supra -note 55, at 317 (quoting 0. Schactner, from J. KAPuN, AcRoss
THE SPACE FRONTIER 118 (C. Ryan 1st ed. 1952)).
z2 G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII) (1958) proclaimed that the space environment was to be
used for the "common interest of mankind" and for the "benefit of mankind;" both
UNGA Res. 1472 (XIV) (1959) and UNGA Res. 1721 (XVI) (1961) stated that space
was to be used in the "common interest of mankind" and for the "betterment of
mankind." Matte, supra note 55, at 318 n.17.
I' The Outer Space Treaty states that the exploration and use of outer space is to
be carried out "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their
degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind."
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, at art. 1(l).
I' See United States House Comm. on Science and Technology, Hearings, Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Space Science and Applications on International Space Activ-
ities, 96th Cong, 1st Sess. 96 (6 Sept. 1979) (Statement of Leigh Ratiner) [Hereinafter
Hearings I]
2, Christopher Pinto, Sri Lanka's Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference
said of the common heritage concept in the Law of the Sea: "if you touch the nodules
at the bottom of the sea, you touch my property. If you take them away, you take my
property." See Kevin B. Walsh, Controversial Issues Under Article XI of the Moon
Treaty, 6 ANNALS OF AiR AND SPACE L. 489, 491 (1981). (quoting Proceedings of the
Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, Workshop (Dec. 11-14, 1978)). An excellent descrip-
tion of the characteristics of the common heritage concept was presented by Nicolas
Matte. Those elements are that:
(I) the area under consideration cannot be subject to appropriation; (2) all
countries must share in its management; (3) there must be an active sharing
of benefits reaped from the exploitation of resources; (4) the area must be
dedicated to exclusively peaceful purposes, and (5) the area must be pre-
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For them, the common heritage of mankind incorporates three
central concepts: (1) the absence of private ownership rights in
the property deemed to be the common heritage of mankind;
(2) the management of the property by a multinational body;
and (3) the sharing of benefits flowing from the use or exploi-
tation of the property with all countries without regard to their
input in a particular project or expedition.
1 21
Within the American capitalist community, tremendous re-
servations have existed over whether to join the treaty. The
United States has always maintained that common heritage was
governed by the freedom of the seas theory but did not embody
any substantive rules or a predetermined legal regime to regulate
activities.'2 The original United States' support for the treaty
faltered because of this strong opposition.' 27 The corporate com-
munity has successfully argued that the ambiguity of the concept
leaves open the possibility that the third world's interpretation
of the common heritage concept would be accepted into the
corpus spatialis, which would be deleterious to the free enter-
prise/free market economy. 28 This view was best illustrated by
Alexander Haig, then President of United Technologies Corpo-
ration:
Clearly, the common heritage concept expressed in the treaty
underlies third world efforts directed at a fundamental redis-
tribution of global wealth .... In advancing the concept of
common heritage, Third World Countries have indicated they
intend to gain control over critical raw materials and to gain
access as a matter of right to the technology needed to exploit
them .... Proceeding any sooner with signing and ratification
served for future generations.
Matte, supra note 55. at 320-21 (quoting from a list derived from Pardo's historic note
verbale: "Declaration and Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful
Purposes of the Seabed and of the Ocean Floor, Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits
of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of Their Resources in the Interests of
Mankind," U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.75 (1967).
' See Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 739.
' Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1980)
[hereinafter Hearings Il].
I" Ervin, supra note 12, at 421. (Some of the groups within the United States that
lobbied so strongly against the treaty were the L-5 Society, the America Mining Congress,
and United Technologies Corp.)
In Walsh, supra note 124, at 492.
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is opposed by United Technologies, because it would doom
any private investment directed at space resource exploita-
tion.129
The former Soviet Union opposed the common heritage con-
cept since its inception. They believed that, while it is true that
exploitation entails responsibility to future generations, that re-
sponsibility "only justifies space being an international area for
common use."' 30 It is claimed by some that the Soviet position
was a desire to achieve middle ground between the American
capitalist free market view and the third world "common prop-
erty" concept: limited space exploration by the state.' In real-
ity, it is just a watered down version of res nullius. The Soviet
position subordinated the interests of the international commu-
nity to that of the state. While they did not claim ownership,
the Soviets rejected any limitation on their use of space re-
sources, so long as their actions did not rise to the level of "a
national appropriation" of commonly accessible exhaustible re-
sources.
13 2
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no
noticeable change in policy. The nations of the Commonwealth
of Independent States have yet to sign the current Moon Treaty.
There is no reason to expect that they will. There is also no
indication that their view of the common heritage concept is
likely to change so dramatically as to breathe new life into the
foundering Moon Treaty.
1 See Hearings II, supra note 126, at 219-20. Under the Carter Administration,
the United States voted in the General Assembly for the Moon Treaty Resolution. See
supra note 53-55 and accompanying text. Under President Reagan, the United States
dramatically changed its position and refused to ratify the treaty. Interestingly, Alexander
Haig, an outspoken critic of the Moon Treaty became Secretary of State under President
Reagan and presided, as head of United States foreign policy, over the dismantling of
American support for the Moon Treaty.
30 Ervin, supra note 12, at 420.
I d. It is unclear what the Soviet position is in the wake of "perestroika." It is
unlikely that they will adopt the third world view, given that they posses the technology
to exploit space unilaterally. It is also unlikely that they would mirror the United State's
position; the Soviets do not have the economic base to compete with the western capitalist
countries. A likely posture for the Soviets is some movement towards the capitalist view.
However, as long as the major industries and technologies remain in the hands of the
state, nationalism will remain a core of the Soviet position. See Jaksetic, supra note 68,
at 505 ("... the Soviet Union's refusal to accept the Third World's position on natural
resources demonstrates its desire to permit the use of resources in outer space for
nationalistic ends").
032 Jaksetic, supra note 68, at 503-04.
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For whatever philosophical reason, former Soviet and current
American reservations about the definition of "common heri-
tage" effectively terminated any chance that the current Moon
Treaty would be ratified. However, by coming to a consensus
definition of common heritage and including it in the language
of the treaty, the problem of ambiguity may be avoided.1
33
b. Moratorium
There are two kinds of moratoria feared by the developed
countries: a legal restriction against mineral exploitation and a
de facto restriction which results from the ambiguity of the
current treaty.'3
(1) Legal Moratorium
According to some opponents, the treaty imposes a legal
moratorium pending the creation of the international regime.
Their position is based on three foundations. First, a moratorium
is implicit in the common heritage principle. 3 Second, according
to Article 11(5), once exploitation is about to become feasible,
a regime is to be negotiated; thus, the regime precedes exploi-
tation. 36 Third, Article 6(2) limits the use of celestial resources
to "scientific investigations" and only in "appropriate quanti-
ties.' ' 37 It is irrelevant that these arguments are fallacious. "' As
W' alsh, supra note 124, at 497.
See id. at 496.
Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art.XI(l); Stephen Gorove, Draft Treaty Relating
to the Moon: An Overview and Evaluation, PROC. OF THE 19TH COLLOQuWuM ON THE
LAw OF OUTER SPACE 42, 44 (1977).
1 Hearings II, supra note 126, at 15 (statement of Roberts Owen).
'17 K. Narayana Rao, Editorial Comment: Common Heritage of Mankind and the
Moon Treaty, 21 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 275, 278 (1981).
" The negotiating history of the treaty is "replete with unequivocal statements by
the United States that we would not accept a moratorium and that the common heritage
concept did not imply a moratorium." Hearings II, supra note 126, at 15 (statement of
Roberts Owen). Furthermore, attempts by some states to impose a moratorium until a
regime was established were decisively rejected. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203 (1979)
(statement of S. Neil Hosenball); Hearings II, supra note 126, at 15 (statement of
Roberts Owen). Finally, "Article 11(8) of the treaty provides that 'all activities' with
respect to natural resources shall be carried out in a manner compatible with the purposes
of the regime set forth in Article 11(7), and this provision was specically included in
the treaty to establish principles which would cover exploitation carried out before
establishment of an international regime. Hearings 11, supra note 126, at 15-16 (no
moratorium was intended or established) (statement of Roberts Owen) (emphasis added).
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long as the developed countries believe there is a moratorium,
they are unlikely to sign the agreement.
(2) De Facto Moratorium
There are two reasons given by corporations and developed
countries for their belief that the treaty imposes a de facto
moratorium. First, the common heritage principle is too vague. 3 9
There is no accepted definition of the common heritage of
mankind in the Moon Treaty. S. Neil Hosenball, the head of
the American Delegation to COPUOS has stated that "it would
be impossible to come up with a definition in a space context."''
4
The United States and other developed countries see this ambi-
guity of the common heritage concept as leaving open the pos-
sibility of having to live with the broadest of interpretations:
that common heritage means the unacceptable-common own-
ership.141 Second, the uncertainty as to the type of regime that
Will be established makes potential investors reluctant to invest
in outer space exploitation.' 42 It is argued that in an area that
requires very large investments in innovative technology, no
corporation will engage in the necessary fifteen to twenty years
given the risk that all their efforts will be nullified by an unfa-
vorable regime.' 43 Corporations, it is argued, could not be ex-
"' This criticism has been made against all resource arrangements in space, includ-
ing remote sensing, television satellite broadcasting, and natural resource exploitation.
See Wassenbergh, Speculations on the Law Governing Space Resources, 5 ANNALS OF
Am & SPACE L. 611, 614 (1980).
140 Walsh, supra note 124, at 490. This ambiguity is noted by Glenn Reynolds and
Robert Merges:
A review of the Moon Treaty's negotiating history supports the view that
the term [common heritage of mankind] does not [imply] and need not
lead to the use in a lunar resource regime of procedures and criteria
developed in any other context . . . To quote one space commentator, the
phrase is "purely declaratory .. .and open to all interpretations" ...
Conversations with delegates to the Outer Space Committee reinforces...
the feeling that the phrase is in essence a continuation of the very general
concept from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty of space as the "common
heritage of mankind" with an attempt to move into language more com-
monly used in international language. In addition, to date, no two dele-
gations have said the term means the same thing at any given time.
Reynolds & Merges, supra note 5, at 131.
"' It is ironic that the Soviet Union and some American corporations find them-
selves in agreement when the Americans have labeled the common heritage concept as
"international socialism." See Mau, supra note 22, at 257-58.
" See Walsh, supra note 124, at 496.
143 Hearings II, spra note 126, at 16 (statement of Roberts Owen).
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pected to make the initial investments without a legal framework
to govern extraterrestrial resource development.'" One outspo-
ken critic of the treaty has observed:
Such large capital investments cannot be made by free enter-
prise without clear legal guidelines that allow commercial op-
erations to exploit space resources for profit. Free enterprise
institutions simply cannot make significant investments in space
while they are under the threat of lawsuits over the meaning
of treaty terms or ex post facto appropriation of their invest-
ments by a nebulous future international regime.1
4
As with legal moratoria, it is not relevant that these argu-
ments are wrong. 1' The commercial and psychological beliefs of
developed countries have doomed the treaty. Their perception
that the current treaty will chill their investment in lunar mining
" Allan Duane Webber, Note, Extraterrestrial Law and the Final Frontier: A
Regime to Govern the Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427,
1433 (1983).
"I Art Dula, Free Enterprise and the Proposed Moon Treaty, 2 HOUSTON J. INT'L
L. 3, 18 (1979).
I" All of these arguments are false. First, the common heritage concept was tailored
to satisfy the developed countries' reservations about its potential interpretations. The
very language of the treaty states that common heritage is to be operationally defined
within the four corners of the agreement:
Article 11(1). The "moon and its natural resources are the common
heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provision in the
provisions of this Agreement and in particular paragraph 5 of this article"
[which is a commitment by all signatories to establish an exploitation
regime]."
Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 11(1).
In effect, the developed countries have agreed that implicit in the common heritage
principle is the recognition of the need to create an international resource exploitation
regime. "In exchange, the developing countries agreed not to insist on a provision
imposing a moratorium pending the establishment of the regime." Patricia Minola,
Comment, The Moon Treaty and the Law of the Sea," 18 SAN Dteoo L. REv. 455, 468
(1981).
Second, the regime gives certain guarantees about the type of regime that is to be
created. One of those guarantees is that the efforts of those countries that are engaged
in exploration must be taken into consideration in the regime. Moon Treaty, supra note
3. at art.l l(7)(d). It is obvious that statement makes reference to the technologically
developed countries (e.g., the United States and the Soviet Union).
Finally, the "de facto moratorium" argument is empirically false. There have been
numerous cooperative space projects embarked upon by private investors. For example,
Radio Corporation of America, Astro-Space Division, Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm,
and Aerospatiale have teamed up to vigorously engage in international satellite contract-
ing. Also, the Soviet Union and the United States both engage in joint space projects
with other countries and corporations. Raclin, International Cooperation in Commercial
Activities in Outer Space, supra note 42, at 239.
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is all that matters. The solution is a new treaty that alleviates
the reservations that exist among potential space developers while
remaining true to the principles of "equality and mutual benefit"
that are at the core of third world support for the Moon Treaty.
c. Problems of Establishing a Regime
Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Moon Treaty states that as
exploitation of the moon's resources is about to become feasible,
parties to the Moon Treaty are to "undertake to establish an
international regime.. .to govern the exploitation of the natural
resources of the moon."' 47 The controversy surrounding the
creation of the regime is over questions about the type of regime
that will be established. Currently, there is no existing regime
under the Moon Treaty. 14 The agreement requires states to join
before they can participate in the creation of a resource regime. 1
49
This creates a couple of problems for developed countries and
their corporate constituencies. Initially, to participate in the re-
gime negotiations, the investment community will have to accept
the common heritage principle.?IS This they will not do. 5 , Ad-
ditionally, the treaty requires that any regime embrace the notion
of "equitable sharing by all States in the benefits de-
rived.. . .52 This is unacceptable to the powerful corporations
because it is too open to subjective interpretation"3 and the
danger exists that the "concept of equitable sharing is inconsis-
tent with the concept of profit, and without profit motive private
enterprise cannot be expected to risk capital on space invest-
ments."s
4
- Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, supra note 88.
" Peter D. Nesgos, The Proposed International Sea-Bed Authority as a Model for
the Future Outer Space International Regime, 5 ANNALs OF AIR & SPACE L. 549, 551-
52 (1980).
1,9 Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 11(5).
116 See Rao, supra note 137, at 278. Rao argues that the conventional obligation
to create an international regime also obligates parties to apply the stipulated objectives
of the treaty in the creation of the regime. One of those objectives is the recognition
that the moon is the common heritage of humankind. See Moon Treaty, supra note 3,
at art. 11(l). Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,
prescribes: 'every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith.' An agreement to agree is to be equally performed in good
faith." Rao, supra note 137, at 278.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 119-33.
,2 Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. ll(7)(d).
1" Griffin, supra note 73, at 762.
114 Matte, supra note 55, at 323. See also text accompanying notes 120-47.
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Many developed countries have looked to the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention' 5 for guidance concerning the establishment
of a regime under the Moon Treaty.5 6 They did not like what
they saw. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention applies to the
resources of the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil outside the
national jurisdiction of any state. 5 7 An International Seabed
Authority (the Authority) is created by the sea treaty to license
and regulate "polymetallic nodule"' 58 exploitation in the sea-
bed. 15 9 The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention creates its own
governmental mining firm (the Enterprise) to participate in com-
petition with private corporations that have been licensed by the
Authority. 60 Access to mineral rights is limited to parties that
have been licensed by the Authority, and every private corpo-
ration must be "sponsored" by a member state before exploi-
tation can be sanctioned.' 6' Furthermore, every mining request
must provide two mining areas of equal value for potential
development: the authority will pick one for the applicant, and
the other will belong to the Enterprise.' 6 2 The regime also re-
- U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Final Act of the Third U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Sales No. E. 83 V.5
(1983) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Law of the Sea].
" The Law of the Sea is similar to the Moon Treaty in that they both declare the
area in question to be the common heritage of mankind and that resource exploitation
is to be carried out "for the benefit of mankind . . . taking into particular consideration
the interests and needs of developing States and of peoples who have not obtained full
independence.. ." Id. at arts. 136, 140.
I" Id. at arts. 1, 13, 55-76. The sea agreement delineates the areas that are outside
the national jurisdiction of any country. Basically, each state that borders the oceans
has a "territorial sea" that is up to 12 miles from the shoreline, over which the coastal
nation has complete sovereignty. Id. at art. 87. Then there is a "contiguous zone,"
which extends beyond the territorial sea up to 24 miles past a country's shoreline.
Though not sovereign, a coastal state may enforce its custom, immigration, and sanitary
laws as necessary. Id. at art. 33. Finally, there is an "exclusive economic zone," which
extends up to 200 miles. This zone gives exclusive rights to a coastal country to conserve,
manage, and exploit all resources found therein. Law of the Sea, supra note 155, arts.
55-75. This zone also includes any "continental shelf" that may exist; which is also
under the exclusive economic control of a bordering costal state. Id. at art. 76. See
Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 740 n.83.
- Polymetallic (also known as manganese) nodules are dark, potato-shaped rocks
that exist on the floor of the world's oceans. Their mineral content varies, but generally
includes nickel, copper, manganese, and cobalt. They are predominantly found in the
Pacific, near the Baja peninsula and just south of Hawaii. Van Dyke & Yuen, supra
note 19, at 496 n.7.
" Law of the Sea, supra note 155, at arts. 156-69.
10 Id. at art. 170. See Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 740.
'6, Law of the Sea, supra note 155, at art. 137.2, Annex III.
- Id.
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quires the "equitable sharing of financial and other [informa-
tional and technological] benefits derived from resource recovery
activities." 16 Finally, the regime creates a "one-nation-one-vote"
decision-making process for most major decisions.'"4 Many de-
cisions require two-thirds to three-quarters of the votes.' 65 With
probably less than eight of the treaty's parties likely to engage
in deep seabed mining, they would be at the mercy of the third
world. 1'
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention also establishes a
system for dispute settlement. Article 186 of the Convention
creates a Special Dispute Chamber of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (the Chamber).' 67 The Chamber exists to
resolve commercial and general conflicts arising from the explo-
ration and exploitation of supranational seabeds and ocean
floors.'"6 The developed countries have rejected this part of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention because of the unfavorable
terms of its regime. Specifically, there was concern that the treaty
would deter development of the oceans' resources. 169 The reasons
for this belief should be obvious from the above description of
the treaty. Those reasons include the equitable sharing require-
ment, technology sharing requirements, the vagueness of the
common heritage principle, compulsory jurisdiction before a
Seabed Disputes Chamber,' 70 as well as the cumbersome and
expensive (annual fee of one million American dollars) licensing
procedures .17
63 Id. at art. 140.
'" See Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 741.
6, Law of the Sea, supra note 155, at arts. 161-62.
-" Interview with Brian Hoyle, Director of the Office of Oceans' Laws, Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dept. State (July,
17, 1986) (quoted in Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 742); See also Minola,
supra note 146, at 466.
165 Law of the Sea, supra note 155, at art. 186.
16 Sylvia Maureen Williams, The Exploration and Use of Natural Resources in the
New Law of the Sea and the Law of Outer Space, PROC. oF rtm 29r CoLouwmu iN
Tm LAw OF OUrER SPACE 198, 199 (1987).
169 Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 742.
Im Developed countries have refused to submit to the Chamber for dispute resolu-
tion because it possesses compulsory jurisdiction. That is, the jurisdiction of the Chamber
is "automatic for all parties to the Convention." Even though the treaty gives potential
litigants a "free choice of means" in deciding what type of tribunal will resolve the
dispute, the developed countries would never accept a binding determination by an
international tribunal that can compel compliance. Williams, supra note 168, at 199-
200.
,71 Id. at 198-200.
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The fear that it will mirror the 1982 Law of the Sea Con-
vention has sufficiently frightened the developed countries away
from ratifying the Moon Treaty. As such, the current Moon
Treaty is not going to work. It has been eleven years since the
General Assembly opened the treaty for ratification. The major
industrialized nations have turned away from it. Unless a new
treaty can be worked out, the developing countries will have no
real options, and the developed countries will formulate their
own cooperative agreements'
72 or act unilaterally. 73
4. Controversial Aspects of the Moon Treaty-Concerns of
Developing Countries
The Moon Treaty is not only problematic for the developed
countries. Several aspects of the treaty are potentially disadvan-
tageous for underdeveloped countries, as well.
a. Failure to Achieve Equity
The international law concept of equity is a tool for achieving
fairness and reasonableness. 74 In achieving its goals, equity man-
ifests itself in three ways: (1) it can be used to adapt existing
law to a particular set of facts (equity infra legem); (2) it can
be used as a reason for refusing to apply an unjust law (equity
contra legem); and (3) it can be used to fill gaps in the law
(equity praeter legem). 171 Unlike the Anglo-American view of
equity as a judicial tool to remedy "wrongs," 17 6 the international
theory of equity is based upon an attempt to create an overall
,72 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. Another example of cooperative
space arrangements between developed countries is the European Space Agency (ESA).
The members are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. For over
a decade these countries have cooperated on numerous joint missions, including the
provision of commercial launch services, and other significant undertakings. Raclin,
International Cooperation in Commercial Activities in Outer Space, supra note 42, at
238.
"3 This alternative has been the general practice of the United States and the Soviet
Union since Sputnik. However, it is unlikely that many other countries possess the
technology or resources to explore or use space on their own.
174 Baowwua, supra note 24, at 26.
"I Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT'L & COrn'.
L.Q. 801, 801 (1976).
"7 Anglo-American equity is a general principle of law common to major legal
systems, which is limited by the law itself. A common law court cannot do in equity
that which is illegal in law. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 541 (6th ed. 1990).
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system of fairness.177 The developing nations take the position
that existing disparities in living standards between developed
and developing countries are unjust, that dramatic wealth and
power redistribution is a prerequisite for equality of opportunity
in the international community.' 7 International legal equity is
an attempt to change the traditional imbalance between colonial
powers and lesser developed countries. '79
For developing countries, the common heritage concept is an
attempt to achieve equity praeter legemt st through a New Inter-
national Economic Order (NIEO).1'5 This application of equity
is premised on equality, fairness, historical entitlement, capacity
and need.5 2 In short, developing countries desire an "interna-
tional and political structure in which all countries are both de
jure and de facto equally sovereign powers sharing mankind's
resources on an equitable, as-needed basis."' 83 In the eyes of the
third world, the Moon Treaty, like the seabed provisions of the
Law of the Sea Convention, is designed to be a tool for achieving
equity in the area of resource distribution.'14 They believe it is
necessary to compensate for decades of domination and exploi-
'" Ervin, supra note 12, at 429.
' Bilder, supra note 21, at 466.
,19 Mau, supra note 22, at 222; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 102 cmt. m (1987).
" In a sense, this form of equity is less a formal theory of law than a policy
consideration. It relies on extra-legal issues. See Akehurst, supra note 175, at 808. One
author has noted that the subjective nature of developing country equity claims posses
dangers. "Equity notions are subjective; their use will vary according to the attendant
needs of the country employing the doctrine." Mau, supra note 22, at 226.
A prime example is the use of sovereignty. In the supra-national resources problem,
sovereignty is rejected by the third world as a tool for preventing the "equitable"
distribution of vital materials. However, when military intervention or the internal human
rights of a third world nation is at stake, then all is subordinate to sovereignty. Mau,
supra note 22, at 226-27.
' Mau, supra note 22, at 225. The NIEO is an attempt by developing countries
to redress the economic and social imbalance imposed on them by the developed
countries. Bilder, supra note 21, at 451. The NIEO developed from The United Nations
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, Ad. Hoc.
Comm., Special 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1 at 3, Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974),
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974) (declares a new order where "equity, sovereign equality,
interdependence, common interest and cooperation amongst all States" are to remedy
the inequalities in the status quo); G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 2d. Comm., 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, Agenda Item 48, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14
I.L.M. 251 (1975) (recognizing a state's sovereignty over the resources in its own
country).
112 Mau, supra note 22, at 226.
IJ ld. at 227-28.
Id. at 243.
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tation by the colonial powers.""3 In theory, the Moon Treaty is
a success; however, in practice it is a failure.
The Moon Treaty contains several "equity provisions," which
theoretically exist to correct economic imbalance and social in-
justice that were caused and continue to be perpetuated by the
industrialized nations.' 86 The primary examples of the Moon
Treaty's equity provisions are the common heritage principle,
the regime's equitable sharing requirement, and the emphasis on
cooperation between nations in exploration and exploitation of
the moon. 187 To the extent that it embodies equity principles,
the Moon Treaty has succeeded in articulating the revolutionary
concepts of the NIEO in the ideological debate. 88 However,
there "is a lack of continuity between the Moon Treaty's ideo-
logical pronouncements and its practical applications." 189 As
indicated above, the potential for inequality,'90 the fact that the
developed countries will not ratify the treaty, 19' and the uncer-
tainty of the regime that will be created'9 mean that, in practice,
the current treaty has failed to prevent anything other than a
"first come, first served" scenario of resource allocation that is
repugnant to the third world and the NIEO. 93
Furthermore, the Moon Treaty's equity provisions are frus-
trated by textual inconsistencies. First, scientific research may
be used to engage in "illegal" mining and use of resources.
Article 6(2) is the only part of the treaty that allows for the
85 Kosmo, supra note 18, at 1080. See also infra text accompanying notes 204-10.
" Bilder, supra note 21, at 466-67.
I See Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 11.
8 Minola, supra note 146, at 468.
89 Mau, supra note 22, at 250.
This view presented by the United States Representative to COPUOS on April
19, 1973:
The draft agreement . . . as part of the compromise made by many dele-
gations, places no moratorium upon exploitation of the natural resources
of the celestial bodies, pending the establishment of the international regime
... The United States is not prepared to accept an express or implied
prohibition on the possible natural resources before the international con-
ference meets and agrees on appropriate machinery and procedures a treaty
containing then take effect.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203 (1979) (quoted in Rao, supra note 137, at 275-76).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57. It is also true that very few third
world countries have signed the Moon Treaty. However, that is a product of the first
world's rejection of the treaty and the dilution of the common heritage concept in the
final draft which one could argue will lead to more global inequality.
' See supra text accompanying notes 148-55.
See, Minola, supra note 146, at 469.
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collection and removal of samples of the moon's minerals. How-
ever, that removal is limited to amounts appropriate for scientific
research.' 94 The problem is that because the treaty does not
define "scientific investigations" and "appropriate quantities,"
the treaty may create a gaping loophole for the "scientific"
study of the types and quantities of minerals that are on the
moon. Japan has used a similar loophole to count the number
of whales in the ocean by killing them. Second, the prohibition
against lunar appropriation may be circumvented by the "in
place" clause. Article 11(3) denies property rights to the moon's
minerals that are "in place."'" However, the obvious argument
is that minerals that are not "in place" are not subject to the
treaty. Natural resources that have been reduced to possession
by the act of removing them from their original location are
free to be exploited.'" This language opens the possibility of a
state or private party extracting resources from the moon, claim-
ing that those "removed minerals" are legally obtainable. 9
Third, Article Xl's prohibition against national or corporate
appropriation of lunar resources seems to be negated by a sub-
sequent provision that allows for various activities usually as-
sociated with appropriation and property rights. 98 The agreement
allows for the establishment and ownership of the infrastructure
necessary for a commercial exploitation program. Article 12(1)
permits the placement of personnel, vehicles, equipment, instal-
lations, stations and facilities on or below the moon.'" Pros-
criptions against national appropriation and property rights seem
to be illusory. Though Article XI explicitly rejects rights of
national appropriation and property, it also specifically sanctions
activities as if such rights did, in actuality, exist.
200
There is one last problem with the equity provision. Because
the international law definition of equity is open to subjective
' See Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 6(2).
I' ld. at art. 11(3).
" Christol, supra note 4, at 481.
M9 Rao, supra note 137, at 277. It is untenable that the actual intent of the treaty
would be to allow the appropriation of minerals only after they have been taken from
the lunar soil, but not before. If a state does not have property rights to lunar resources,
how do the resources become the possession of any state merely because they have been
extracted? If the treaty does tolerate such a bizarre outcome, it will have the effect of
de-linking possessory rights from property rights. See Rao, supra note 137, at 277.
I Gorove, supra note 135, at 179.
'" Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 12(1).
Walsh, supra note 124, at 494.
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interpretation, 201 it can be corrupted so that "fairness" and
"redistribution of wealth" are considered mutually exclusive
concepts. For example, developed countries might invoke the
"equitable sharing" concept to justify excluding those countries
that did not invest and participate in a particular mining project.
This view is best illustrated by Stephen Doyle of the Office of
Technology Assessment:
The key concept for realizing the use and benefits of space is
equity. Benefits cannot flow to the indolent. Non-contributors
can take no measure of satisfaction from the labors of others.
Opportunities must be nondiscriminatory and there must be a
possibility for all to contribute to and share in endeavors in
space. But returns must reflect contributions. There is no "free
lunch."0
Poor nations cannot rely on the equity provisions of the Moon
Treaty. Seemingly distinctive terms like "equitable sharing" may
be construed by nationalistic or corporate interests so that their
true meaning is lost. As such, it is unlikely that the bulk of
third world nations would adopt such a potentially lopsided
treaty.
b. Neo-Neocolonialism
The poorer countries of the world are very familiar with
colonialism. After experiencing colonialism and neocolonialism
at the hands of the European empires, the third world had
resolved to not allow that again. One of the intended purposes
for the Moon Treaty was to prevent the type of destructive and
conflict-marred colonialism that has plagued our planet for over
four hundred years.203 In the past, colonizing nations "effec-
"I Griffin, supra note 73, at 762.
Stephen E. Doyle, Significant Developments in Space Law: A Projection for the
Next Decade," 9 J. SPACE L. 105, 110 (1981). The absurdity of Doyle's position is made
clear by his very next sentence: " The benefits of space are to be available to all nations
... that is agreed." It seems that he believes that by saying it that it will become true.
He fails to realize that access to space is controlled by developed countries. So long as
the first world controls access to outer space and its resources, the third world will never
be able to "contribute" substantially to a mining project absent some arrangement.
See generally 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 298-303 (1979). Some have suggested
that there is no need for a Moon Treaty because a colonial framework is a desirable
and effective model for lunar resource development. See, e.g., Myers, Political Consid-
erations on Some Aspects of the Law of Outer Space, PROC. OP THE 18STH COLLOQUUM
ON TiE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 66, 68 (1976).
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tively" occupied and controlled territory to the exclusion of all
others and then promulgated laws to govern the area. 2 This
resulted typically in a political and economic system based on
the subordination of the dependent state and ongoing conflict
to prevent other powers from supplanting the old government
with a new government.o's
The Moon Treaty fails to prevent the colonialism it was
designed to thwart. Prior to the adoption of a regime, some
believe that the treaty permits a period of colonialism because
of the diverging interpretations of the treaty's provisions. Each
nation will be left to follow its own interpretation of the debat-
able provisions. 206 Furthermore, the problem of colonialism will
complicate the eventual negotiations to establish a regime. Be-
cause voting is "one-nation-one-vote,"20 7 the developed countries
(neo-neocolonialists) would be pitted, to their numerical disad-
vantage, against the developing countries (the earth-bound by-
standers). The result would either be the adoption of a regime
that the developed countries would reject or the failure of any
Webber, supra note 144, at 1431.
" On earth, colonial powers were threatened, not only by existing colonial rivals,
but also by indigenous revolutions from within. In the case of space colonization,
confronting an indigenous uprising is not likely in this solar system, because we are
unaware of any intelligent native populations on any of our sister planets. However, it
is likely that if humans continue to expand outward they will encounter intelligent life,
and that life will likely find it interesting that we have claimed outer space as the
sovereign territory of the human race. Eugene Mallove, astronautical engineer at the
M.I.T. Lincoln Laboratory has noted:
[T]he Galaxy may be teeming with life and technology. But even without
relying upon detailed speculations as to the probabilities of planetary
formation, chemical and biological evolution, and the rise of intelligence,
technology, and the like, we can observe that, in all of nature's variety,
there is no phenomenon that happens only once. With apparently billions
of opportunities-for life to arise in our galaxy alone, it would be astounding
if we turned out to be the sole example of intelligent life.
Eugene Mallove, Renaissance in the Search For Galactic Civilizations, 87 Technology
Review 1, 51 (Jan. 1984) (emphasis added) Other authors agree. See STERN, CULTURES
BEYOND rHt EARTH 38 (1st ed. 1975) ("There is a high probability that civilization is a
universal phenomenon... Indeed, the available data ... suggest[s] that life is a fairly
commonplace occurrence in the universe... There are several billion planetary systems
in the galaxy and, of them, about a billion worlds may be populated with their own
varieties of living organisms."); CnRSTIAN, Ex ATERaEST1AL INTELLIGENCE: THE FIRST
ENCOUNTER 21 (1st ed. 1976) ("There is no valid rationale by which we can continue to
hold that, as an intelligent organism, man is unique in the universe ... It is a virtual
certainty that extraterrestrial creatures who are intelligent, aware, and sagacious do, in
fact, share our universe").
20 Webber, supra note 144, at 1441.
' See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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regime to pass. 20 The only other alternative is that the developed
countries would force a colonial-type regime upon the third
world, threatening them with total exclusion from space if they
fail to capitulate. The only solution is to "insulate celestial
bodies from the conflicts endemic to nationalism. "20 By focus-
ing on mankind and not nation-state considerations, a treaty
and regime can be developed that will move forever away from
colonial solutions.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR THE FuTuRE: MOON TREATY II
The time has come for a workable treaty. We know what
resources are available. Technologically, we are within reach of
engaging in lunar and asteroidal mining programs. Most impor-
tantly, the very survival of humanity may depend on how swiftly
space industrialization and mining occur.
A. An Arrangement is Needed
The celestial bodies210 of our solar system offer a vast amount
of resources. 21' We know 'vhat types of celestial resources are
available from examination of asteroids21 and samples taken
from the moon. 2 3 It is generally accepted that there is a wealth
Webber, supra note 144, at 1443.
2M Id.
2,0 Celestial bodies include the sun, planets, planet satellites (like the Moon), aster-
oids, and stars. Doyle, The Legal and Policy Implications of Treating Natural Resources
as the Common Heritage of Mankind, 29-r CottOQUIUM ON TRE LAw OF OUTER SPACE
31, 35 (1987).
2, This paper is limited to a consideration of the resources found and within the
celestial bodies of our solar system. There are, however, many other resources in the
space environment that deserve a mention. Prominent among these are solar energy,
radio (electro) magnetic spectrum, the geo-stationary orbit, and low-g vacuum. See
generally Clas. G. Wihlborg & Per Magnus Wijkman, Outer Space Resources in Efficient
and Equitable Use: New Frontiers for Old Principles," 24 J. L. & Eco. 23, 23-28 (1981).
"' "The three largest asteroids alone contain enough materials for the construction
of new lands with a total area many thousands of times as large as that of the earth.
Once the asteroidal resources are tapped, we should have not only metals, glass, and
ceramics, but also carbon, nitrogen, and hydrogen. These three elements, scarce on the
moon, are believed to be abundant in the type of the asteroid known carbonaceous
chondritic." Gerard K. Oneill, Space Colonies: The High Frontier, FUTRIST 25, 27
(Feb. 1976).
"I The moon is rich in minerals. Most of the materials required to build a self-
sufficient lunar station are available on the moon itself; over half the moon, for example,
is made up of oxygen. Titanium, silicon, and aluminum are also found in abundance.
FUTURIST 25, 63 (Feb. 1985).
1992-93]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
of exploitable elements and energy sources available in space,
including oxygen, silicon, carbon, calcium, aluminum, iron, ti-
tanium, manganese, magnesium, chromium, water, nitrogen, and
hydrogen. 214 How large is the "wealth" of resources in space?
It is effectively unlimited. 215 The resources of space are so great
that even the most backward third world country would find
"an abundance" remaining when it finally reached space. 216 For
example, the removal of half a million tons of material from
the lunar surface (a bulldozer working for five years) sounds
large-scale. However, such an excavation would literally only
"scratch the surface" of what is available for exploitation.2 17
Technological and capital requirements are not an obstacle
for the exploitation of celestial resources. 218 For over ten years,
humankind has been in a technological position to proceed with
lunar resource development. 219 Scientists have also identified
techniques for capturing asteroids and mining them.? The same
industrial revolution that put life on the moon has the potential
for taking life from the earth. Our planet is ravaged. The ozone
layer, drinkingwater and Amazon depletion, greenhouse effect,
acid rain, starvation, and overpopulation all create a gloomy
outlook for the future.
Our only hope for preventing the inevitable destruction of
the planet is to stop environmental degradation and overpopu-
lation. Space resources are the solution. If used equitably, we
can not only supply all humanity with food, shelter, and energy,
See Hearings 1, supra note 126, at 37 (statement of Dr. Robert Frosch, Ad-
ministrator of NASA); Raclin, From Ice to Ether, supra note 39, at 728.
215 The term unlimited is meant only in a figurative sense, because it is becoming
apparent that nothing is unlimited. Originally, the ancients believed that the air and the
bounty of the seas were unlimited. They had no demonstrable reason to think otherwise.
But today, with our growing global population in the billions, and with the massive
abuse of our resources, we discovered that the air and seas are not indefatigable. The
same is true with the sun. We now know that it is a self-consuming furnace that in due-
course will proceed through a life cycle which will see it eventually expand, collapse,
and then explode. Doyle, supra note 210, at 32.
216 Oneill, supra note 212, at 31-32.
-' Id. at .27. Such an excavation would only be 200 meters long and wide and five
meters deep.
"I Webber, supra note 144, at 1427.
219 See Hearings II, supra note 126, at 33 (discussion with Sen. Schmidt); see also
Committee Print, supra note 54, at 267 (discussing resources on the moon and potential
utility of other resources) ("there is no insurmountable technological barrier to extrater-
restrial resource exploitation").
- See Committee Print, supra note 54, at 418.
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but also spare our threatened planet and permit its recovery
from the ravages of the industrial revolution.Y'
B. A Proposal
As is indicated throughout this paper, the current Moon
Treaty is an ineffective solution to the dual problem of satisfying
both the developed and underdeveloped countries. The goal is
to create a treaty that will insure the rapid exploitation of space
resources, while at the same time protecting the interests of those
countries that are not developed enough to directly participate.
The Moon Treaty should be amended. Only then can consensus
be reached on laws to govern the exploitation of lunar and other
celestial resources.
The following is a proposal for a new Moon Treaty that will
attempt to satisfy the problems identified in this paper. Because
many aspects of the original proposal are not controversial and
need not be abandoned, the 1979 Moon Treaty is used as a
foundation for the draft proposal, "Moon Treaty II." Additions
to the original proposal are identified through the use of italics.
Deletions from the original treaty are identified through the use
of strike outs.
"I Oneill, supra note 212, at 26. One study indicated that, if begun soon, com-
mercial development of celestial resources could move nearly all our industrial activity
away from Earth's fragile biosphere before 2075 A.D. Id. at 32. Other predictions see
world-wide impact early in the twenty-first century. See Salmon, "Resupplying Spaceship
Earth," The Global Predicament 214 (1979); see also Committee Print, supra note 54,
at 267 (lunar experimentation with this technology could begin in twenty years if billions
of dollars are committed to the project).
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DRAFT PROPOSAL
Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
[MOON TREATY II]
The States Parties to this Agreement,
Noting the achievements of States in the exploration and use
of the moon and other celestial bodies,
Recognizing that the moon, as a natural satellite of the earth,
has an important role to play in the exploration of outer space,
Determined to promote on the basis of equality the further
development of cooperation among States in the exploration,
exploitation, 222 and use of the moon and other celestial bodies,
Desiring to prevent the moon from becoming an area of
international conflict,
Bearing in mind the benefits which may be derived from the
exploitation of the natural resources of the moon and other
celestial bodies,
Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
Acknowledging the obligation of the developed States to
facilitate the economic advancement of the poorer States through
This is added to avoid the ambiguity that may arise between the words "ex-
ploitation" and "use." "Use" could potentially involve any activity on (or under) the
surface of the moon. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1710 (4th ed. 1957). "Exploitation"
has a more specific meaning: "utilization by application of industry ... or other means
... as [in] the exploitation of a mine or a forest." Id. at 689. See also WEBSTER'S
TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 801 (unabridged 1976) ("utilization or working
of a natural resource").
Undoubtedly, the term "use"in the 1979 treaty includes exploitation. Nevertheless,
exploitation should be independently mentioned. First, the treaty has several official
languages. See Moon Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 21. Second, nations have empirically
used every opportunity to define controversial terms in the Moon Treaty to their
advantage. See supra text accompanying notes 175-210. The risk that the word "use"
might be defined as to exclude "exploitation" is too great. The impact of such a
definition would be to destroy the integrity of the treaty as a resource regulation regime.
See Fasan, Celestial Bodies and the Exploitative Use of Outer Space, 12 ANNALs OF Am
& SPACE L. 227, 229 (1987) ("... the meaning of 'use' and 'appropriation' might create
a collision of rights over the question of the exploitation of celestial bodies...").
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the sharing of information, resources, and technology produced
from space exploration, exploitation and use,
Keeping in mind the need to promote investment in space
through a stable political environment,"3
Taking into account the need to define and develop the
provisions of these international instruments in relation to the
moon and other celestial bodies, having regard to further pro-
gress in the exploration, exploitation, 2 24 and use of outer space,
Have agreed on the following:
Article I
1. The Provisions of this agreement relating to the moon
shall also apply to the other celestial bodies within the solar
system, other than the earth, except in so far as specific legal
norms enter into force with respect to any of these celestial
bodies.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement reference to the
moon shall include orbits around or other trajectories to or
around it.
3. This Agreement does not apply to extraterrestrial mate-
rials which reach the surface of the earth by natural means.
Article 2
All activities on the moon, including its exploration, exploi-
tation,225 and use, shall be carried out in accordance with inter-
national law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations,
and taking into account the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970,
in the interest of maintaining international peace and security
w As is indicated throughout this paper, there are at least two competing philos-
ophies on space property rights and obligations owed to other states. See supra text
accompanying notes 17-30. The two sentences preceding this note were added to the
treaty to promote both philosophies.
Some believe that profit motive and ameliorating third world concerns cannot be
reconciled in one document. See generally Dula, supra note 145, at 16-18. Others,
including myself, believe that equity is a two way street. Recognizing the debt owed to
the third world, the treaty should manifest an attempt to overcome the perceived northern
centrism and potential neo-neocolonialism without discouraging the capitalist community
from developing space and its vast resources. See generally Mau, supra note 22, at 255.
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
1992-931
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. L.
and promoting international cooperation and mutual under-
standing, and with due regard to the corresponding interests of
all other States Parties.
Article 3
1. The moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively
for peaceful purposes.
2. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or
threat of hostile act on the moon is prohibited. It is likewise
prohibited to use the moon in order to commit any such act or
to engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the moon,
spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or human-made226 space
objects.
3. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other
trajectory to or around the moon objects carrying nuclear weap-
ons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction or place
or use such weapons on or in the moon.
4. The establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct
of military manoeuvres on the moon shall be forbidden. The
use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equip-
ment of facility necessary for peaceful exploration, exploita-
tion,227 and use of the moon shall also not be prohibited.
Article 4
1. The exploration, exploitation,22n and use of the moon
shall be the province of all humankind 229 and shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespec-
tive of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due
regard shall be paid to the interests of present and future gen-
erations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of
living and conditions of economic and social progress and de-
- Without belaboring the issue, the original treaty only refers to mankind and this
addition is to act as a symbol of commitment to the equality of all people on the planet
to share in the resources of outer space, regardless of gender. While, the term "mankind"
probably refers to men and women (as the two components of mankind), that is not a
certainty. See WBSTER's Ttm NEw INTERNAIoNAL DIcTIoNARY, supra note 222, at
1376. (" 1: the human race: the totality of human beings... 2: Men as distinguished
from women...").
' See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
2 See supra, note 222 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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velopment in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
2. States Parties shall be guided by the principle of coop-
eration and mutual assistance in all their activities concerning
the exploration, exploitation,230 and use of the moon. Interna-
tional cooperation in pursuance of this Agreement should be as
wide as possible and may take place on a multilateral basis, on
a bilateral basis or through international intergovernmental or-
ganizations.
3. Prior to the creation of the regime to govern the exploi-
tation of the moon's resources, as indicated in Article 11 of this
Agreement, States Parties shall contribute to the development
of underdeveloped States from any profits obtained through the
exploitation of the moon's natural resources. This contribution
shall take the form of a fee to be paid by any person, organi-
zation, government, corporation, or other entity that has en-
gaged in the removal of any minerals from the moon or its
subsurface. The amount of that support shall be 3.75% of the
imputed value of the resources removed from any exploitation
projects. This paragraph shall not be construed to mean that the
international regime to be created pursuant to Article 11 of this
Agreement shall be limited in its power to adjust the amount of
profits to be contributed to the development of underdeveloped
States Parties to this Agreement.
231
23 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
' This provision exists to insure that developed countries that are engaged in
profitable space exploitation contribute a modicum of assistance to the development of
third world nations, under the theory that third world nations are incapable of their
own exploitation programs until they develop their economic and technological bases.
See generally Mau, supra note 22, at 239-56.
The language giving the regime the discretion to revise the amount to be paid into
the Moon Treaty Development Fund exists to give administrative flexibility to the regime,
as the future permanent body with the authority to govern lunar resource exploitation.
The amount 3.75% was chosen so as to strike a balance between those that see
lunar resources as common property and those that see lunar resources as merely
accessible to all. The specific amount was derived from the Deep Seabed Mineral
Resources Act. In that section there is a 3.75% tax imposed on the minerals extracted
from the seabed. 26 U.S.C. § 4495(b) (1990). The rationale for choosing the same
amount for the draft Moon Treaty is that if 3.75% is an amount that the most developed
capitalist space power is willing to tax its own citizens for seabed miming, then the same
amount would be acceptable as a space exploitation tax. The following is the Deep
Seabed Mineral Resources Act section that was used to determine the amount levied
through the draft proposal:
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 26. INTER1 AL REVENUE CODE
SUBTITLE D-MISCELLANEOUS EXCISE TAXES
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4. The revenue generated pursuant to paragraph 3 of this
article shall be deposited in a bank chosen by and at the discre-
tion of the Secretary-General. The deposited revenues shall be
designated the "Moon Treaty Development Fund." 212 The Moon
Treaty Development Fund is to be distributed to underdeveloped
States Parties through a moon treaty subcommittee of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COP-
UOS). The subcommittee shall be composed of a representative
from each State Party. COPUOS is free to promulgate rules for
the fair use and distribution of the Moon Treaty Development
Trust Fund and the effective administration of paragraphs 3 and
4 of this article, as long as the rules are consistent with this
Agreement. 233
Article 5
1. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations as well as the public and the international sci-
CHAPTER 36-CERTAIN OTHER EXCISE TAXES
SUBCHAPTER F-TAX ON REMOVAL OF HARD MINERAL RE-
SOURCES FROM
DEEP SEABED
§ 4495. Imposition of tax
(a) General rule.-There is hereby imposed a tax on any removal of a hard
mineral resource from the deep seabed pursuant to a deep seabed permit.
(b) Amount of tax.-The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) on
any removal shall be 3.75%/0 of the imputed value of the resource so
removed.
(c) Liability for tax.-The tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be paid by
the person to whom the deep seabed permit is issued.
(d) Time for paying tax.-The time for paying the tax imposed by subsec-
tion (a) shall be the time prescribed by the Secretary by regulations. The
time so prescribed with respect to any removal shall be not earlier than
the earlier of-
(1) the commercial use of, or the sale or disposition of, any portion of the
resource so removed, or
(2) the day which is 12 months after the date of the removal of the
resource.
26 U.S.C. 4495 (1990) (Added to Pub.L. 96-283, title IV, § 402(a), 94 Stat. 582 (1980)).
23 This fund is essentially the same as the "Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust
Fund," created by the United States to collect revenues levied against parties that engage
in American authorized Seabed mining. See 30 U.S.C. §1472(a) (1990).
23 Until the international regime is established, the COPUOS sub-committee created
in this agreement is the most appropriate organ to administer the revenue collection and
distribution in the Moon Treaty Development Trust Fund. First, as a product of
COPUOS, its focus is space exploration and regulation. Second, the sub-committee is
composed of states that have signed the Moon treaty; their natural interest in the outcome
of decisions will prompt them to be cautious and thorough.
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entific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable,
of their activities concerned with the exploration, exploitation,
2 3 4
and use of the moon. Information on the time, purposes, loca-
tions, orbital parameters and duration shall be given in respect
of each mission to the moon as soon as possible after launching,
while information on the results of each mission, including sci-
entific results, shall be furnished upon completion of the mis-
sion. In the case of a mission lasting more than sixty days,
information on conduct of the mission, including any scientific
results, shall be given periodically, at thirty-day intervals. For
missions lasting more than six months, only significant additions
to such information need be reported thereafter.
2. If a State Party becomes aware that another State Party
plans to operate simultaneously in the same area of or in the
same orbit around or trajectory to or around the moon, it shall
promptly inform the other State of the timing of and plans for
its own operations.
2A. State Parties engaged in the exploitation or use of an
area on the moon or in its orbit can prevent simultaneous
operations by another State Party in the same area for one year
from the time that mutual use of that area is formally requested.
A formal request is one that is delivered in writing to a State
Party, with a copy being delivered to the Secretary-General.235
3. In carrying out activities under this Agreement, States
Parties shall promptly inform the Secretary-General, as well as
the public and the international scientific community, of any
phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon,
which could endanger human life or health, as well as any
indication of organic life.
Article 6
1. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation on the
moon by all States Parties without discrimination of any kind,
on the basis of equality and in accordance with international
law.
2. In carrying out scientific investigations and in further-
ance of the provisions of this Agreement, the States Parties shall
21 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
" This provision was added to allow states an opportunity to engage in exploitation
of areas that they have identified, at their own expense, as mineral rich, while at the
same time recognizing the inherent right of all state parties to engage in exploitation of
any materials that are the common heritage of mankind.
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have the right to collect on and remove from the moon samples
of its mineral and other substances. Such samples shall remain
at the disposal of those States Parties which caused them to be
collected and may be used by them for scientific purposes. States
Parties shall have regard to the desirability f making, upon the
request of a State Party, and if reasonably available, make236 a
portion of such samples available to other interested States Par-
ties and the international scientific community for scientific in-
vestigation. States Parties may in the course of scientific
investigations also use mineral and other substances of the moon
in quantities appropriate for the support of their missions.
2A. Paragraph 2 of this article shall in no way be construed
as to impose an implied or explicit moratorium on the explora-
tion, exploitation, or use of the moon.
2 7
3. States Parties agree on the desirability of exchanging
scientific and other personnel on expeditions to or installations
on the moon to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.
4. Feasibility and practicability shall not be construed to
mean that a State Party may deny information merely because
it is not in its interest to do so.
238
Article 7
1. In exploring and using the moon, States Parties shall
take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance
of its environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in
that environment, by its harmful contamination through the
introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise. States
Parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully affecting the
environment of the earth through the introduction of extrater-
restrial matter or otherwise.
"' The deleted language did not require a state party to provide scientific samples
upon request. The added language requires sharing of materials, but leaves open the
possibility that unreasonable requests need not be honored.
1' As is indicated above, many believed that the current treaty created either a
legal or de facto moratorium on the space exploitation pending the creation of an
international regime. See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
- As is true with any international agreement, it is difficult to enforce provisions
that require states to act in ways that are not to their immediate benefit. However, states
are required to act in good faith. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties prescribes: "every treaty in force is binding upon all parties to it and must be




2. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations of the measures being adopted by them in ac-
cordance with paragraph 1 of this article and shall also, to the
maximum extent feasible, notify him in advance of all place-
ments by them of radioactive materials on the moon and of the
purposes of such placements.
3. States Parties shall report to other States Parties and to
the Secretary-General concerning areas of the moon having spe-
cial scientific interest in order that, without prejudice to the
rights of other States Parties, consideration may be given to the
designation of such areas as international scientific preserves for
which special protective arrangements are to be agreed upon in
consultation with the competent bodies of the United Nations.
Article 8
1. States Parties may pursue their activities in the explora-
tion, exploitation,23 9 and use of the moon anywhere on or below
its surface, subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
2. For these purposes States Parties may, in particular:
(a) Land their space objects on the moon and launch
them from the moon;
(b) Place their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, fa-
cilities, stations and installations anywhere on or below the
surface of the moon. Personnel, space vehicles, equipment, fa-
cilities, stations, and installations may move or be moved freely
over or below the surface of the moon.
(c) Engage in the exploration, exploitation, and use of
the moon anywhere on or below its surface."1
3. Activities of States Parties in accordance with Paragraph
I and 2 of this article shall not interfere with the activities of
other States Parties on the moon, except as provided in Article
5, paragraph 2A of this Agreement or subject to regulations
imposed by the regime to be created subject to Article 11.24
Where such interference may occur, the States Parties concerned
shall undertake consultations in accordance with Article 15, par-
agraphs 2 and 3 of this Agreement.
23 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
'' This was added so there is no misunderstanding that developed countries are
legally allowed to engage in the complete use of the moon and its resources prior to the
creation of a regime.
11 See supra text accompanying note 236.
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Article 9
1. States Parties may establish manned and unmanned sta-
tions on the moon. A State Party establishing a station shall use
only that area which is required for the needs of the station and
shall immediately inform the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the location and purposes of that station. Subse-
quently, at annual intervals that state shall likewise inform the
Secretary-General whether the station continues in use and
whether its purposes have changed.
2. Stations shall be installed in such a manner that they do
not impede the free access to all areas of the moon of personnel,
vehicles and equipment of other States Parties conducting activ-
ities on the moon in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement or of Article I of the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
3. States Parties that build stations, installations, and any
other facilities shall make them available to any requesting States
Parties, after being given sufficient notice. As such, in building
and setting up stations, facilities, and installations, States Parties
shall make arrangements for facilitating the needs of potential
requesting States Parties. Arrangements shall include but are not
limited to provisions for food, shelter, safety, health, access to
research and research facilities, as well as assistance and training
so as to help underdeveloped States Parties become self-sufficient
in the exploration, exploitation, and use of the moon, its surface,
and subsurface.241
4. States Parties that are invited into stations, facilities, or
installations by any State Party are under obligation to disclose.
the purpose of their entry and disclose the products of any of
their exploration, exploitation, or use of the moon or its sub-
surface, while using the station, facility, or installation. 243
" Consistent with the notions that the third world is under-developed, in part,
because of the past colonial domination of their societies, and that by providing oppor-
tunities for space research and development, they will move closer to their own inde-
pendent exploitation programs, this paragraph was added to provide those opportunities
for advancement necessary for self-sufficiency in space exploitation. See supra text
accompanying notes 204-10.
, This section requires the visiting third world delegation to disclose the product
of their mission while guests in another state's lunar post. It would not be fair to require
developed states to provide third world states access to their own information and




1. States Parties shall adopt all practicable measures to
safeguard the life and health of persons on the moon. For this
purpose they shall regard any person on the moon as an astro-
naut within the meaning of Article V of the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
and as part of the personnel of a spacecraft within the meaning
of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space.
2. States parties shall offer shelter in their stations, instal-
lations, vehicles and other facilities to persons in distress on the
moon. This paragraph shall not be construed to limit the obli-
gations of parties under Article 9, paragraphs 3 or 4.14
Article 11
1. The moon and its natural resources are the common
heritage of humankind,2 45 whih finds its -. p.ssi n in the pro
visions of this Agreement,in paFtieular in paragraph 5 of this
a-Ftiel. The common heritage of humankind shall be construed
to identify those areas that are not subject to appropriation,
that call for a management system where all States participate,
that imply a sharing of at least some of the benefits derived
from the exploration, exploitation, and use of the area, and that
the area is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.27 It is
further understood that the common heritage of humankind
concept recognizes:
(a) the absence of private ownership rights in the property
deemed to be the common heritage of humankind;
See supra text accompanying notes 243-44.
us See supra text accompanying note 227.
One of the problems with the original agreement is the lack of a firm definition
of the common heritage concept. See supra text accompanying note 119-34. Instead of
operationally defining common heritage of mankind, the proposed revision creates an
independently standing definition that is an attempt to bring together the concerns of
all potential parties to the agreement.
It is extremely difficult to come up with a consensus definition of common
heritage of humankind. The definition proposed in the treaty proposal is an attempt to
identify those areas where there is some agreement. See Williams, supra note 168, at
200.
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(b) access to property deemed to be the common heritage
of human kind;m
(c) the equitable sharing of benefits flowing from the
exploration, exploitation, or use of property deemed to be the
common heritage of humankind;249
(d) recognition of the rights of States Parties to explore,
exploit and use property deemed to be the common heritage of
humankind.250
2. The moon is not subject to national appropriation by
any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
any other means.
3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon,-ne
any par thereof or natural r s ure in pla e, "'2shall become
property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-
The rejection of private property ownership and the recognition that states have
access to all areas that are the common heritage of humankind is an attempt to satisfy
the above discussed concerns of both the first and third worlds. See supra text accom-
panying notes 119-210.
"9 It should be noted that developing countries had originally insisted that the
"equitable sharing" concept includes distribution of celestial resources without regard
to the amount of effort contributed by a particular state. See Committee Print, supra
note 54, at 13-14. This concept, predictably is unacceptable to the capitalist community.
See Mau, supra note 22, at 257-58 (appendix - advertisement by United Technologies
Corporation). The language in the draft proposal views equitable sharing as a balance
between the needs of the developed and under-developed nations. "Opportunities must
be non-discriminatory and there must be a possibility for all to contribute to and share
in endeavors in space. Returns, however, must reflect contributions." See Martin Menter,
Commercial Space Activities Under the Moon Treaty, 7 SYRAcUsE J. INT'L L. & Com.
213, 233 (1980) (quoting S. Doyle from a paper presented at a symposium at the
University of Mississippi Law Center, April 21, 1980). The benefits reaped from exploi-
tation of the moon should consider the amount of effort and energy that a party
contributed. Nevertheless, the revised Moon Treaty provides for an indirect sharing of
the benefits derived from the moons resources, through the access and trust fund
provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
The right to "explore, exploit, and use" the moon is recognized in the draft
proposal as part of the common heritage concept. This was added to relieve any concern,
that a moratorium might be imposed once the international regime is created. Some
believe that a regime dominated by third world nations might lock-up space resources.
See Mau supra note 22, at 258. However, by inserting it into the common heritage
concept, "exploration, exploitation, and use" cannot be restricted absent repeal of the
treaty itself.
"I The term "in place" in the Moon treaty is controversial. Developing states
believe, that the language allowed ownership rights for any property that has already
been extracted from the moon. See supra notes and accompanying text. However, the
only reason it would be controversial is if there is a problem with exploiting the resources
on or under the surface of the moon. That is no longer a problem because states may
now exploit celestial resources, subject to the restrictions and obligations imposed in the
draft proposal.
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governmental organization, national organization or non-govern-
mental entity, or of any natural person. The placement of per-
sonnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and
installations on or below the surface of the moon, including
struggles connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not
create a right of ownership over the surface or subsurface of the
moon or any areas thereof. The foregoing provisions are without
prejudice to the international regime referred to in paragraph 5
of this article.
4. States Parties have the right to exploration, exploita-
tion,2s2 and use of the moon without discrimination of any kind,
on the basis of equality and in accordance with international
law and the provisions of this Agreement.
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to
establish an international regime, including appropriate proce-
dures, to govern the natural resources of the moon as such
exploitation is about to become feasible. This provision shall be
implemented in accordance with Article 18 of this Agreement.
6. In order to facilitate the establishment of the interna-
tional regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article, States,'
Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations
as well as the public and the international scientific community,
to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of any natural
resources they may discover on the moon.
7. The main purposes of the international regime to be
established shall include:
(a) the orderly and safe development of the natural re-
sources of the moon;
(b) the rational management of those resources;
(c) the expansion of opportunities in the use of those
resources;
(d) an equitable sharing by all States Parties in the ben-
efits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and
needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those
countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to
the exploration or exploitation 2 1 of the moon, shall be given
special consideration. Equitable sharing, in the context of this
Agreement, does not mean the dramatic wealth and power re-
distribution that is a prerequisite for any meaningful equality in
" See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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the international community. However, equitable sharing does
require a distribution of some of the benefits from the explo-
ration, exploitation, and use of the moon and its resources to
the poorer States Parties to this Agreement. Until an interna-
tional regime is established, equitable sharing shall be limited to
the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 9, paragraph 3
of Article 4, and Article 6 of this Agreement.
25
(e) the maintenance of the moon and its resources as the
common heritage of humankind.2"5
7A. The international regime to be created pursuant to this
article shall engage in the regulation of States Parties and activ-
ities in the exploration, exploitation, and use of the moon and
its natural resources. The regime shall include regulations on,
among other matters:
56
(a) Licenses for exploration of the moon and its resources
and permits for exploitation and use of recovered resources -
including application, duration, review, fees, conditions and res-
trictions, priority of issuance, denial, suspension, revocation,
and modification;
(b) diligence of States Parties engaged in resource recov-
ery;
(c) protection of the environment;
(d) interference with other resource recovery programs;
(e) records and Public Disclosure; and
2" The purpose of this paragraph is to insure that equity guides the distribution of
resources prior to the creation of the regime. Equitable sharing is defined in the
paragraph, indicating a balance between the interests of developed and under-developed
states. For an analysis of equity and equitable sharing, see supra text accompanying
notes 175-203.
zM This paragraph is in the draft proposal is to insure that resources extracted
under the auspices of the international authority are governed by the common heritage
principle.
The uncertainty as to the type of regime that is to be created is a major concern
of the developed states. See supra notes and accompanying text. This addition is an
attempt to provide some information about the regime before it is created.
Only a regime divorced from terrestrial conflicts can effectuate the goals of both
the developed and under-developed states. Webber, supra note 144, at 1450. Some
believe that such a regime should be created now. CAm. Q. CHRISTOL, Tam MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW or OUTER SPACE 42, 252 (1982). The draft proposal is limited to a
basic sketch of what a regime would include. Any in-depth regime would be too
speculative at this time. Too many issues have not been debated and resolved by the
world community. For example, there is no consensus on the type of decision-making
body that will govern the regime, the type and weight of voting on regime issues,
jurisdiction, the regime's major functions, and the amount of national sovereignty to be
sacrificed to the regime. See generally Webber, supra note 144, at 1450-55.
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(f) enforcement and dispute resolution.257
8. All the activities with respect to the natural resources of
the moon shall be carried out in a manner compatible with the
purposes specified in paragraph 7 of this article and the provi-
sions of Article 6, paragraph 2, of this Agreement.
Article 12
1. States Parties shall retain jurisdiction and control over
their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations,
and installations on the moon. The ownership of space vehicles,
equipment, facilities, stations, and installations shall not be af-
fected by their presence on the moon.
2. Vehicles, installations and equipment or their component
parts found in places other than their intended location shall be
dealt with in accordance with Article 5 of the Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space.
3. In the event of an emergency involving a threat to human
life, States Parties may use the equipment, vehicles, installations,
facilities or supplies of other States Parties on the moon. Prompt
notification of such use shall be made to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations or the State Party concerned.
Article 13
A State Party which learns of the crash landing, forced
landing or other unintended landing on the moon of a space
object, or its component parts, that were not launched by it,
shall promptly inform the launching State Party and the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations.
Article 14
1. States Parties to this Agreement shall bear international
responsibility for national activities on the moon, whether such
activities are carried out by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities
are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in
this Agreement. States Parties shall ensure that non-govern-
mental entities under their jurisdiction shall engage in activities
2. These areas of regulation were derived from Law of the Sea and the Internal
Revenue Code on Deep Seabed Mineral Resources. See generally LAW OF TE SEA, supra
note 155; Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, supra note 231.
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on the moon only under the authority and continuing supervision
of the appropriate State Party.
2. States Parties recognize that detailed arrangements con-
cerning liability for damage caused on the moon, in addition to
the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activ-
ities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space In-
cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
may become necessary as a result of more extensive activities on
the moon. Any such arrangements shall be elaborated in accor-
dance with the provisions provided for in Article 18 of this
Agreement.
Article 15
1. Each State Party may assure itself that the activities of
other States Parties in the exploration, exploitation,258 and use
of the moon are compatible with the provisions of this Agree-
ment. To this end, all space vehicles, equipment, facilities, sta-
tions, and installations on the moon shall be open to other States
Parties. Such States Parties shall give reasonable advance notice
of a projected visit; order that appropriate consultations may be
held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure
safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the
facility to be visited. In pursuance of this article, any State Party
may act on its own behalf or with the full or partial assistance
of any other State Party or through appropriate international
procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in
accordance with the Charter.
2. A State Party which has reason to believe that another
State Party is not fulfilling the obligations incumbent upon it
pursuant to this Agreement or that another State Party is inter-
fering with the rights which the former State has under this
Agreement may request consultations with that State Party. A
State Party receiving such a request shall enter into such con-
sultations without delay. Any other State Party which requests
to do so shall be entitled to take part in the consultations. Each
State Party participating in such consultations shall seek a mu-
tually acceptable resolution of any controversy and shall bear in
mind the rights and interests of all States Parties. The Secretary-
m See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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General of the United Nations shall be informed of the results
of the consultations and shall transmit the information received
to all States Parties concerned.
3. If the consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable
settlement which has due regard for the rights and interests of
all State Parties, the parties concerned shall take all measures to
settle the dispute by other peaceful means of their choice. If
difficulties arise in connexion [sic] with the opening of consul-
tations or if consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable
settlement, any State Party may seek the assistance of the Sec-
retary-General, without seeking the consent of any other State
Party concerned, in order to resolve the controversy. A State
Party which does not maintain diplomatic relations with another
State Party concerned shall participate in such consultations, at
its choice, either itself or through another State Party with the
Secretary-General as intermediary.
Article 16
With the exception of Articles 17 to 21, references in this
Agreement to States shall be deemed to apply to any interna-
tional intergovernmental organization which conducts space ac-
tivities if the organization declares its acceptance of the rights
and obligations provided for in this Agreement and if a majority
of the States members of the organization are States Parties to
this Agreement and to the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. States members
of any such organization which are States Parties to this Agree-
ment shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the organi-
zation makes a declaration in accordance with the foregoing.
Article 17
Any State Party to this Agreement may propose amendments
to the Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force for each
State Party to the Agreement accepting the amendments upon
their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the
Agreement and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the
Agreement on the date of acceptance by it.
Article 18
Ten years after the entry into force of this Agreement, the
question of the review of the Agreement shall be included in the
provisional agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations
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in order to consider, in the light of past application of the
Agreement, whether it requires revision. .wver, at any time
after the Agreement has been in foree for five years, the Secre-
tary General of the United Natiens, as dep.sitry, shall, a the
regucst ef enc third of the States PartieS te the Agceenet and
with the eeneufrcnce of the mfajority Of the States Parties, eo
vene a conference of the States Parties to review this Agreement.
A review conference shall also consider the question of the
implementation of the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 5, on
the basis of the principle referred to in paragraph 1 of that
article and taking into account in particular any relevant tech-
nological developments.
Article 19
1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by all States
at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by sig-
natory States. Any State which does not sign this Agreement
before, its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of
this article may accede to it at any time. Instruments of ratifi-
cation or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
3. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth
day following the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of
ratification.
4. For each State depositing its instrument of ratification
or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall
enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit
of any such instrument.
5. The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signa-
tory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date
of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession to this
Agreement, the date of its entry into force and other notices.
Article 20
Any State Party to this Agreement may give notice of its
withdrawal from the Agreement one year after its entry into
force by written notification to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from
the date of receipt of this notification.
Article 21
The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chi-
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nese, English, French, German, Japanese, 25 9 Russian and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies
thereof to all signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly au-
thorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed
this Agreement, opened for signature at New York on December
31, 1990.
CONCLUSION
This paper is an attempt to reconcile the diverging interests
of the developed and underdeveloped states in the creation of a
lunar resource agreement. Both developed and underdeveloped
states have refused to ratify the current Moon Treaty. It is my
position that clearing up ambiguous concepts and recognizing
the concerns of all interested parties in the text of a moon treaty
are the first steps toward reconciling the competitive concerns
of developed and underdeveloped states over the exploitation of
the moon and other celestial bodies.
In the twelve years since the General Assembly sent the Moon
Treaty to the states for ratification, no major space power and
few developing countries have agreed to sign.m It is my hope
that Moon Treaty II is used as a starting point for a new round
of negotiations on the future of the moon and its resources. The
future of our planet, and possibly our existence, are at stake.261
21 This is added in recognition of the leading role that Japan plays in the technology
and economic world and of the role that Germany is expected to play in the near future.
m" See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
" The new order, to which space policy should ultimately strive, should not only
focus on the ultimate benefits to be derived by all mankind - as they have a subjective
connotation and may, sometimes, be less promising than expected - but rather on a
continuous effort to assure humanity's survival. This might produce the necessary
ultimate solidarity of mankind and hope to avoid possible star wars by a gradual transfer
of military technology to international civil use. The alternative is eternal silence. Matte,
supra note 55, at 335 (quoting Nicolas Matte, Space Programmes Today and Tomorrow:
The Vanishing Duopole 130 (1980)).
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